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ANTICIPATING A SEA CHANGE FOR INSIDER TRADING LAW:
FROM TRADING PLAN CRISIS TO RATIONAL REFORM
John P. Anderson*
Abstract
The Securities and Exchange Commission is poised to take action in
the face of compelling evidence that corporate insiders are availing
themselves of rule-sanctioned Trading Plans to beat the market. These
Trading Plans allow insiders to trade while aware of material nonpublic
information. Since the market advantage insiders have enjoyed from Plan
trading can be traced to loopholes in the current regulatory scheme,
increased enforcement of the existing rules cannot address the issue. But,
simply tweaking the existing rule structure to close these loopholes would
not work either. This is because the SEC adopted the current rule as a part
of a delicate compromise with the courts in the “use versus possession”
debate over the proper test of scienter for insider trading liability. The
current rule reflects the SEC’s preferred test (mere “awareness”), but it
provides for Trading Plans as an affirmative defense in order to pass
judicial scrutiny. Thus, any attempt to simply close the loopholes in
Trading Plans while maintaining the awareness test would upset this
delicate compromise. Only a comprehensive change to the current insider
trading enforcement regime can address the issue.
The reform proposed here begins with the recognition that Plan
trading is generally done with the firm’s awareness and consent. Such
trading is therefore a form of issuer-licensed insider trading. Since there
are strong arguments that there is no moral wrong or economic harm done
by issuer-licensed insider trading, the regulatory regime should openly
embrace it as a permissible form of compensation through firm-sanctioned
Modified Trading Plans, so long as there is adequate disclosure. Though
such liberalization would represent a radical departure from the current
enforcement regime, it would be within the SEC’s rulemaking authority,
and would be consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Most importantly,
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it would dramatically improve the current enforcement regime in terms of
justice, clarity, efficiency, and coherence.
It is sometimes said there is nothing like a good crisis for effecting
much needed change. The current media attention and public scrutiny over
corporate insiders’ exploitation of rule-sanctioned Trading Plans may be
just the crisis to spur the SEC to adopt a more rational and just approach
to insider trading enforcement. The outline for such reform is proposed
here.
I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2012, the Manhattan office for the United States Attorney
launched a criminal investigation into whether corporate executives from seven
different companies violated insider trading laws by improperly trading in shares of
their own company’s stock.1 In an “era of unprecedented insider-trading
prosecutions,”2 this investigation (and others initiated since3) represents a shift in
focus by prosecutors and regulators from the aggressive prosecution of trading on
material nonpublic information by tippees and misappropriators to true corporate
insiders.4 The change in emphasis is a reaction to mounting public pressure in light
of a recent series of academic studies5 and Wall Street Journal articles6 raising the
1

See Susan Pulliam et al., Insider-Trading Probe Widens—U.S. Launches Criminal
Investigation into Stock Sales by Company Executives, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2012, at A1.
2
Jenny Strasburg & James Sterngold, SAC Hit with Criminal Case—Prosecutor Calls
Hedge Fund ‘Magnet for Market Cheaters’; Firm Denies Wrongdoing, WALL ST. J., July 26,
2013, at A1.
3
See Susan Pulliam et al., Insider-Trading Probe Trains Lens on Boards, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 30, 2013, 12:07 AM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873237981045
78453260765642292, archived at http://perma.cc/F9D7-LJVH (discussing various
investigations brought since December 2012).
4
See Pulliam et al., supra note 1, at A1.
5
See, e.g., Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders’ Strategic Trade, 55
MGMT. SCI. 224, 226 (2009) (describing an academic study that “examines whether insiders
strategically trade within the safe harbor”).
6
See Rob Barry et al., Big Sales by Big Lots Brass—Executives’ Stock Moves Netted
$23 Million Ahead of Bad News in April, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2012, 7:18 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324339204578173680170444970,
archived at http://perma.cc/FK3L-AND5; Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, Trading Plans
Under Fire, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424127887324296604578177734024394950, archived at http://perma.cc/4EC6-CJF5;
Pulliam et al., supra note 3; Pulliam et al., supra note 1, at A1; Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry,
Directors Take Shelter in Trading Plans, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2013, at A1 [hereinafter
Pulliam & Barry, Directors Take Shelter in Trading Plans]; Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry,
Executives’ Good Luck in Trading Own Stock, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2012, 11:17 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444100404577641463717344178,
archived at http://perma.cc/QE56-AH8Y [hereinafter Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good
Luck]; Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, Executives Sold Amid Stock Buyback—Such

2015]

INSIDER TRADING LAW

341

concern that corporate executives are gaining an unfair advantage over the market
by exploiting “loopholes”7 or ambiguities8 in what are commonly referred to as
10b5-1 trading plans.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted Exchange Act
Rule 10b5-19 in 2000 as part of an attempt to clarify the elements of, and defenses
to, insider trading liability under SEC Rule 10b-5.10 Among other things, Rule 10b51 offers corporate executives an affirmative defense against the charge that they
violated insider trading laws when they buy or sell shares in their company’s stock
as part of a written plan (“Trading Plan” or “Plan”) entered into when the insider
was not aware of material nonpublic information.11 This defense is available even if
the insider later becomes aware of material nonpublic information at the time the
Plan trades are executed.12
Transactions, Considered Red Flags to Investors, Raised Concerns Among Employees at
Firm, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2012, at C1; Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, Investors Call for
More Disclosure of Executive Trades, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2012, 12:07 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324020804578147193237802774,
archived at http://perma.cc/MC65-F9PN [hereinafter Pulliam & Barry, Investors Call for
More Disclosure]; Susan Pulliam & Rob Barry, Trading Focus Is Pushed, WALL ST. J., Jan.
24, 2013, at C1; Michael Siconolfi, Pension Funds Seek Insider Curbs, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
31, 2012, 8:01 PM) http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732363550457821178
1992442110, archived at http://perma.cc/HR6G-PRMU; Michael Siconolfi & Jean
Eaglesham, SEC Is Pressed to Revamp Executive Trading Plans, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2013,
8:54 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324059704578473382576553
460, archived at http://perma.cc/T9JM-XXMG.
This recent series of articles was preceded by intermittent treatment of 10b5-1 trading
plans by the Wall Street Journal after Rule 10b5-1 was adopted in 2000. See Matt
Andrejczak, Mattel’s Chief Sells Near Highs Via Prearranged Trading Plan, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 30, 2008, at C18; Tony Cooke, Director’s Trade Plan Shields Against ‘Insider’
Suspicion, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2003, at C15; Tony Cooke & Serena Ng, Insiders Prosper
Despite SEC Rule, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB112320798601405793, archived at http://perma.cc/78TK-D3FV; David J.
Reynolds, Reddy Ice Executives Gain on Prearranged Trading Plans, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10,
2008, at C7; Dionne Searcey & Kara Scannell, SEC Now Takes a Hard Look at Insiders’
‘Regular’ Sales, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2007, at C1; Ed Welsch, Trading Plans Offer a Good
Clue to Sell; Aggressive 10b5-1s Especially Predict Underperformance, WALL ST. J., Apr.
9, 2008, at C4.
7
See, e.g., Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 6 (explaining the existing loopholes).
8
Pulliam & Barry, Directors Take Shelter in Trading Plans, supra note 6, at A1.
9
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2014).
10
See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading: Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug.
24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) [hereinafter August 2000 Exchange
Act Release].
11
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c) (2014). Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B) lays out the specific
requirements a plan must satisfy. Part II of this Article will explain the requirements of Rule
10b5-1 more fully.
12
August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,716 (explaining that the
affirmative defense is available to insiders who trade under a 10b5-1 plan while aware of
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Despite the fact that Rule 10b5-1 precludes insiders from entering into a
Trading Plan while aware of material nonpublic information, multiple studies
indicate that insiders trading through these Plans manage to significantly outperform
the market.13 These studies, along with recent press highlighting examples of
suspiciously timely trades by company executives, have led investors, former
regulators, and academics to conclude that, contrary to the SEC’s intentions for the
rule, it has been a “huge gift to insiders . . . .”14 Insiders are using these Trading Plans
as a “tool” for trading on material nonpublic information while avoiding civil or
criminal liability.15
The concern that Rule 10b5-1 has become a de facto safe harbor for insiders
trading on material nonpublic information has spurred public demands for the SEC
to take action. Thomas Kim, former chief counsel of the SEC’s Division of
Corporation Finance, responded to media reports of Trading Plan abuse, stating that
the SEC would “love to catch” a high-ranking corporate executive abusing the
Trading Plans “and use him as an example.”16 According to Kim, the SEC is
“looking for big cases to send a message.”17 But, for many, enforcement is not
enough. Citing the recent Wall Street Journal articles, the Council of Institutional
Investors (“CII”), a nonpartisan association of public, corporate, and union pension
funds with assets of more than three trillion dollars, sent a December 2012 letter to
the SEC expressing the concern that “many executives at public companies have
adopted practices with respect to Rule 10b5-1 plans that are inconsistent with the
spirit, if not the letter of Rule 10b5-1.”18 CII therefore requested that the SEC
material nonpublic information, so long as the insider was not aware of that information
when entering into the plan).
13
See, e.g., Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6. The Wall Street
Journal’s own study reflects that among 20,237 of insiders “who traded their own company’s
stock during the week before their companies made news, 1,418 executives recorded average
stock gains of 10% (or avoided 10% losses) within a week after their trades.” Id. This was
approximately double the number of those who had the stock “move against them that
much.” Id.; see also Jagolinzer, supra note 5, at 228–30 (noting that Plan 10b5-1 “sales
transactions appear to follow systematic run-ups and precede systematic declines” while
purchases “appear to precede systematic run-ups”).
14
Pulliam & Barry, Investors Call for More Disclosure, supra note 6.
15
Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 6 (“Companies are using these plans as a tool . . .
that allows executives to do insider trading” (quoting Lisa Lindsley, a director at the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Union)).
16
Yin Wilczek, No Conclusion on 10b5-1 Plans, but SEC Monitoring Situation,
Official Says, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 18, 2013, 3:12 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com
/s/news/2d7316f12bf2b30c45edb8a7e04297b1/document/MLHA5C3H65TU?headlineOnly
=false&highlight=Yin+Wilczek, archived at https://perma.cc/E9U9-JZND (quoting Thomas
Kim, former chief counsel of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance).
17
Id.
18
Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors, to Elisse
B. Walter, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 28, 2012) (discussing the potential
misuse of Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans for executive sales of company stock), available at
http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2012/12_28_12_cii_letter_to
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“consider pursuing interpretive guidance or amendments to Rule 10b5-1” to close
loopholes and foreclose the possibility of future abuse of Trading Plans by
exploitation of ambiguities in the Rule.19
Whether or not the studies indicating insider exploitation of Trading Plans are
accurate, perception is often all that matters to the financial markets.20 Moreover,
the uncertainty generated by the confusion and vagueness in the current regulatory
landscape is costly to firms, exposing all Plan trades (innocent and unethical alike)
to suspicion21 and potential litigation. With such pressure mounting for change, it is
almost certain the SEC will take some form of action in the near future.22
There are a number of reasons why an enduring solution to the problem of
Trading Plans will not be simple to tailor within the existing insider trading
enforcement framework. Since much of the problem stems from conduct that is
actually permitted by the letter of the rule, mere interpretive guidance from the SEC
would be inadequate, and attempts to discourage such trading by means of
aggressive criminal prosecution would violate moral and constitutional principles.
This leaves actual revision of the relevant statutes and/or rules as the only viable
option. But Rule 10b5-1 was adopted to effect a delicate compromise between the
SEC and the courts on the issue of whether actual “use” or mere “knowing
possession” of material nonpublic information is necessary to establish liability for
insider trading under Rule 10b-5.23 Since the affirmative defense for Plan trading
was a crucial aspect of this compromise, nothing short of a significant departure
from the current regulatory regime, a complete sea change, will be adequate to
address the exploitation of Trading Plans. In anticipation of such a sea change in
insider trading law, this Article suggests a path forward that, though representing a
radical departure from the existing regime, would preserve its core concerns while
improving it in terms of clarity, efficiency, and justice. A crucial premise of the
proposed reform is that, at least in some circumstances, insider exploitation of
Trading Plans may not be morally wrong or economically harmful.

_sec_rule%20_10b5-1_trading_plans.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3BMD-6EUM.
19
Id. When the SEC did not take immediate action, CII reiterated this request in a May
2013 letter. See Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors,
to Mary Jo White, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 9, 2013), available at
http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2013/05_09_13_cii_letter_to
_sec_rule_10b5-1_trading_plans.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZQ59-4KTM.
20
See Michael S. Melbinger, Rule 10b5-1Trading Plans Gain Attention in National
Spotlight, 9 CCH EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, no. 1, Mar. 20, 2013, available at 2013 WL
5232111.
21
See Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6.
22
See Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 6.
23
See August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,716.
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Part II provides the historical background for Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans. It
begins with a summary of the insider trading regime under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,24 including the element of scienter which gave rise
to the “use” versus “possession” debate that Rule 10b5-1 was intended to resolve.
Part II closes by detailing the requirements of Rule 10b5-1 and the current
understanding of Trading Plans under the rule.
Part III offers context for the current controversy by comparing the SEC’s
intended uses for Trading Plans with the reality of how they are being used by
insiders and firms.
Part IV addresses the extent to which insiders’ use of Trading Plans to gain a
market advantage complies with current law. Although some uses of Trading Plans
are clearly legal and some are clearly illegal, the legal status of a range of Plan
trading remains unclear. Part IV closes by raising moral, constitutional, and
economic concerns weighing in favor of broad reform in the midst of such
uncertainty.
In anticipation of such reform, Part V suggests that many of the simple revisions
suggested by scholars, former regulators, and market participants would either fail
to address the purported problem, or would undermine the delicate “use versus
possession” compromise Rule 10b5-1 was designed to effect. Part V concludes by
suggesting that nothing short of a complete overhaul of the existing regime will
suffice to address the controversy.
Finally, Part VI outlines and defends the reform proposed here. This path to
reform begins with the recognition that Plan trading is typically done with the firm’s
awareness and consent. Thus, even when based on material nonpublic information,
such trading is a form of issuer-licensed insider trading.25 Since there are strong
arguments that no moral or economic harm is done by issuer-licensed insider trading,
such trading should be legalized as a permissible form of compensation, so long as
it is regulated through a modified Trading Plan regime that requires disclosure.
Though such liberalization would represent a radical departure from the current
enforcement regime, it is consistent with precedent permitting persons to trade based
on material nonpublic information in other circumstances and arguably coheres with
the existing insider trading enforcement framework set out by the Supreme Court in
United States v. O’Hagan.26 This proposed liberalization of insider trading law
would be strictly limited to issuer-licensed insider trading through modified, firmsanctioned Trading Plans; it would not protect insiders who trade in violation of
some promise or other commitment to their firms or those who trade on
misappropriated information. And, of course, firms would be required to disclose
their use of these modified Plans, as well as insiders’ profits from their use. Part VI
concludes by emphasizing the ways in which this liberalized insider trading regime
24

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
See John P. Anderson, Greed, Envy, and the Criminalization of Insider Trading, 2014
UTAH L. REV. 1, 28 (arguing that “nonpromissory insider trading”—here, “issuer-licensed
insider trading”—is morally permissible).
26
521 U.S. 642, 675–76 (1997).
25
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would offer an improvement over the existing regime in terms of clarity, efficiency,
and justice.
II. ORIGIN OF 10B5-1 AS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN “USE” AND “POSSESSION”
The crime of insider trading has never been expressly defined by statute or
rule.27 Instead, Congress and the SEC have been content to allow insider trading law
to develop through the courts and by administrative action.28 The principal statutory
authority for modern insider trading law is found in the language of Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act,29 which was implemented by the SEC in Exchange Act Rule
10b-5.30 Section 10(b) proscribes the employment of “any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance” in “connection with the purchase or sale, of any security.”31

27

Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act (which prohibits short-swing trading by corporate
directors, officers, and shareholders who own more than 10% of the company’s stock) and
SEC Rule 14e-3 (which prohibits insider trading in connection with tender offers) are
perhaps exceptions, but they are strictly limited in scope and do not address the typical case
of insider trading. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING
27 (2d ed. 2007).
28
See id. at 28–29. During Congressional hearings concerning the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, it was urged that the crime of insider trading be defined with
specificity, but Congress opted not to do so. Carole B. Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A
Critical Assessment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 DUKE L.J. 960, 988,
993.
29
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). While Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 provide the principal
legislative and statutory authority for the regulation of insider trading (and will be the main
focus of this Article), it should be noted that insider trading cases may be based on other
authority as well. The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 comprises a general antisecurities fraud
provision at 18 U.S.C. § 1348, whereby persons may be imprisoned up to twenty-five years
for “knowingly” executing a “scheme or artifice” to “defraud any person” in connection with
a security of a public company or for obtaining “money or property” under “false or
fraudulent pretenses” in connection with the purchase or sale of any such security. Insider
traders are also sometimes prosecuted under Exchange Act Section 17(a), S.E.C. Rule 14e3 (under Exchange Act Section 14(e)). In addition, prosecutors sometimes rely on the general
mail and wire fraud provisions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 in insider trading cases.
E.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 20 (1987) (defendants convicted under federal
mail and wire fraud statutes in addition to Section 10(b)). Finally, even if an individual is not
found guilty of fraud or deceit in connection with a securities trade, she may still be subject
to criminal prosecution for a process offense such as for knowingly and willfully making a
materially false representation to the SEC or a federal agent during the course of an insider
trading investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012). This is the statutory provision under which
Martha Stewart was ultimately convicted. See Joel M. Athey et al., United States: DOJ Shifts
Stance on False Statements Prosecutions, MONDAQ (June 2, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com
/unitedstates/x/317704/White+Collar+Crime+Fraud/DOJ+Shifts+Stance+on+False+Statem
ents+Prosecutions, archived at http://perma.cc/2AKB-QW6E.
30
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2014).
31
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
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Although Congress designed Section 10(b) as a “catchall”32 clause to give the
SEC flexibility to regulate manipulation and deception in connection with securities
transactions, the Supreme Court has made it clear that “what it catches must be
fraud.”33 The elements of insider trading liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5 must therefore resemble those of common law fraud.34 But while fraud typically
requires an affirmative misrepresentation,35 insider trading usually involves silence
or a failure to disclose.36 Recognizing that the common law only deems silence to
be fraudulently deceptive where circumstances impose a duty of disclosure,37 the
Supreme Court has offered two theories under which a Section 10(b) duty to disclose
exists: the “classical theory” and the “misappropriation theory.”38
Under the classical theory, the duty to disclose arises from the relationship of
trust and confidence between the actual parties to the trade.39 A corporate insider
who seeks to benefit from material nonpublic information by trading in her own
company’s shares thereby violates a “fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
confidence”40 to the current or prospective shareholders of the company on the other
side of the transaction. Recognizing such a duty to disclose guarantees that those
“who have an obligation to place the shareholder’s welfare before their own, will
not benefit personally [at the expense of the shareholder] through [the] use of
material, nonpublic information.”41
The misappropriation theory applies to corporate outsiders who gain material
nonpublic information by deception and then seek to benefit by trading on that
information.42 Under the misappropriation theory, the duty to disclose arises from a
duty of trust and confidence to the source of the information, not to the counterparty
to the transaction.43 The misappropriator deceives “those who entrusted him with
access to confidential information” by depriving them “of the exclusive use of that
information.”44 Combined, the classical and misappropriation theories complement

32

Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980).
Id. at 235.
34
See id. at 225–26.
35
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
36
In the rare cases where insider trading deception does involve an affirmative
misrepresentation, the duty-to-disclose requirement need not be met. E.g., SEC v. Dorozhko,
574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding a hacker’s gaining access to a computer database by
misrepresenting his identity was an affirmative deception so no independent duty to disclose
was necessary to establish the requisite deception under 10(b)).
37
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)
(1976)).
38
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–53 (1997).
39
See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230; see also O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (quoting
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228–29).
40
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)).
41
Id. at 230.
42
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53.
43
Id. at 653.
44
Id. at 652.
33
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one another to fill out the prohibition of insider trading as a form of Section 10(b)
fraud.45
In addition to establishing the duty to disclose, common law fraud requires a
finding of scienter.46 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has consistently asserted that
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 requires a finding of this mental state
of intent to deceive or manipulate.47 For example, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,48
the Supreme Court looked to the language and legislative history of Section 10(b) to
reach the conclusion that mere negligence could not support liability under Rule
10b-5.49 The Court explained that the “words ‘manipulative or deceptive’ used in
conjunction with ‘device or contrivance’ strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended
to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct”50 and “[t]here is no indication . . .
that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter.”51
A. Use Versus Possession
Purchases and sales of a company’s shares by its insiders are quite common.
Indeed, many corporate insiders receive a large portion of their compensation in firm
stock. This compensation would be worthless if the shares could not be sold at some
point.52 Within this context, it is easy to see how the element of scienter can
complicate the already difficult task of insider trading enforcement for the SEC.
Section 10(b) only prohibits insiders from trading in their own company’s shares if
they do so based on material nonpublic information. But there are any number of
alternative, innocent explanations an insider might offer for the sale of shares:
diversifying her portfolio, paying for a child’s upcoming wedding or college tuition,
building a new house, buying a boat, etc. Such alternative motives are easy to
manufacture and difficult to disprove.
Historically, the SEC sought to overcome this challenge by taking the position
that the element of scienter in Rule 10b-5 could be satisfied by the insider’s knowing
possession of material nonpublic information, regardless of whether it is proved the
information actually caused the relevant transaction.53 This strategy met with mixed
45

Id. at 652–53.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
47
See Carol B. Swanson, Insider Trading Madness: Rule 10b5-1 and the Death of
Scienter, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 147, 155 (2003) (noting the Supreme Court “has repeatedly
asserted that [Rule 10b-5] liability involves deceptive acts, not just bad management, and
deception necessarily implicates state of mind”).
48
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
49
Id. at 214 (involving alleged negligence in an audit that failed to uncover a bank
president’s fraudulent investment scheme).
50
Id. at 197.
51
Id. at 202; see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 464–68 (1977)
(holding Section 10(b) liability must involve intent to manipulate or deceive).
52
See, e.g., Karl T. Muth, With Avarice Aforethought: Insider Trading and 10b5-1
Plans, 10 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 65, 67 (2009).
53
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 27, at 90.
46
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results in the courts. In United States v. Teicher,54 an attorney fed material nonpublic
information about his firm’s corporate client’s merger and acquisition plans to others
who then traded on that information.55 The tippee traders were convicted of insider
trading pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.56 The traders appealed their
convictions by challenging, inter alia, the jury instruction that embraced the SEC’s
possession standard.57 In dicta, the Second Circuit endorsed the SEC’s possession
standard,58 noting that (1) the “in connection with” language of both Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 is to be interpreted “flexibly;”59 (2) the mere possession standard
comports with the “disclose or abstain” maxim that is so often quoted in insider
trading jurisprudence;60 and (3) the “knowing possession” standard has the practical
benefit of simplifying the task of enforcement.61
In SEC v. Adler,62 however, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the SEC’s knowing
possession standard. This case involved a corporate director’s sale of shares in his
own firm’s stock while in knowing possession of material nonpublic information.63
The director offered the defense that the sale in question was part of a trading plan
that predated his acquisition of the material nonpublic information in question.64 The
court began its analysis by noting that while Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5-1 do not
expressly address the question of whether an insider’s mere possession of material
nonpublic information at the time of trading is enough to establish liability, their
language “suggests a focus on fraud, deception, and manipulation.”65 Next the court
recognized that the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated, if only in dicta, that the
element of scienter for insider trading under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5-1 requires
proof the insider or misappropriator “use[d],”66 “[took] advantage of,”67 or traded
“on the basis of,”68 material nonpublic information. In addition, the court pointed
out that even the SEC has been inconsistent on the issue of “use versus possession.”69
54

987 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 114–17.
56
Id. at 118.
57
Id. at 119.
58
Based on the entirety of the record, the court concluded that any defect in the
instruction was harmless because, even on a causal connection standard, no reasonable jury
could have reached a different result. See id. at 121.
59
Id. at 120.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).
63
Id. at 1339.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1333.
66
Id. at 1333–34 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659–60 (1983)).
67
Id. at 1333 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226–28 (1980)).
68
Id. at 1334 (quoting United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997)).
69
Id. at 1335 n.26. The Court notes that in In re Investors Mgmt. Co., [1970–71 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), ¶ 78,163, at 80,514, 80,519 (July 29, 1971), “the SEC
concluded that one of the elements of an insider trading violation under § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 is that the material nonpublic information ‘be a factor in the insider’s decision to effect
55
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Ultimately, the Adler court concluded the “use test” is the most appropriate because
it “best comports with the language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and with Supreme
Court precedent.”70
Nevertheless, in a nod to the difficulty the SEC faces in proving use in this
context, where “the motivations for the trader’s decision to trade are difficult to
prove and peculiarly within the trader’s knowledge,”71 the court holds that “when an
insider trades while in possession of material nonpublic information, a strong
inference [of use] arises . . . .”72 The insider can, however, “rebut the inference by
adducing evidence that there was no causal connection between the information and
the trade.”73 Later that same year, the Ninth Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit in
expressly rejecting the SEC’s possession test in United States v. Smith,74 this time in
the context of a criminal insider trading case. The Smith court relied heavily on the
reasoning of Adler.75
B. SEC Adopts Rule 10b5-1
With two circuits rejecting the SEC’s knowing possession test in the same year,
the trend in the courts appeared to be in favor of requiring a causal connection
between the possession of material nonpublic information and trading to establish
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Rather than risk further erosion of its
enforcement power by the courts, the SEC proposed Rule 10b5-1 a year later in
December 1999,76 and it was adopted in October 2000.77
The preliminary note to Rule 10b5-1 explains that the rule “defines when a
purchase or sale constitutes trading ‘on the basis of’ material nonpublic information
in insider trading cases brought”78 under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The note
adds that the law of insider trading is “otherwise defined by judicial opinions
construing Rule 10b-5, and Rule 10b5-1 does not modify the scope of insider trading
law in any other respect.”79
the transaction.’” Adler, 137 F.3d at 1336. The court then points out that, later, in Report of
the Investigation in the Matter of Sterling Drug, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH), ¶ 81,570, at 80,295, 80, 298 (Apr. 18, 1978), the SEC reversed course, stating
“Rule 10b-5 does not require a showing that an insider sold his securities for the purpose of
taking advantage of material non-public information.” Id.
70
Adler, 137 F.3d at 1337–38.
71
Id. at 1337.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
155 F.3d 1051, 1070 (9th Cir. 1998).
75
See id. at 1066–69.
76
See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7787,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,228, at 82,846 (Dec. 20, 1999).
77
See August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,716.
78
Trading “on the basis of” Material Nonpublic Information in Insider Trading Cases,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2014).
79
Id.
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Section (a) of Rule 10b5-1 incorporates both the classical and misappropriation
insider trading theories by expressly providing that among the “manipulative and
deceptive devices” prohibited by Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is included the
purchase or sale of a security “on the basis of”80 material nonpublic information “in
breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or
derivatively, to the issuer of that security,” its shareholders, “or to any other person
who is the source of the material nonpublic information.”81 The “use versus
possession” issue is then addressed in Section (b) by defining “on the basis of” for
purposes of the rule as nothing more than being “aware” of material nonpublic
information at the time of the trade.82 In defining “on the basis of” in terms of
“awareness,” one commentator notes “the SEC may have indulged in some linguistic
legerdemain, . . . arguably transforming a phrase that connotes a deliberate act . . .
into something less.”83
Though the SEC chose the term “aware” rather than “possess,” it appears to be
a distinction without much of a difference.84 The final release announcing the rule’s
adoption explains that “the goals of insider trading prohibitions . . . are best
accomplished by a standard closer to the ‘knowing possession’ standard,”85 but,
nevertheless, the SEC recognizes that “an absolute standard based on knowing
possession, or awareness, could be overbroad in some respects.”86 The release
explains that the “new rule attempts to balance these considerations by means of a
general rule based on ‘awareness’ of the material nonpublic information, with
several carefully enumerated affirmative defenses.”87 The sole perceivable
distinction between knowing possession and the awareness standard adopted
appears to be the availability of affirmative defenses in Section (c) of the rule.

80

Id. § 240.10b5-1(a); see also Swanson, supra note 47, at 191.
Id. § 240.10b5-1(a).
82
Id. § 240.10b5-1(b).
83
Allan Horwich, The Origin, Application, Validity, and Potential Misuse of Rule
10b5-1, 62 BUS. LAW. 913, 921 (2007).
84
The SEC has not defined the term “aware,” choosing to leave it to the courts to
determine whether it requires some degree of knowledge beyond mere knowing possession.
See id. at 921–22.
85
August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,727. As one commentator
notes, “[t]aken in isolation, this rationale simply says that lowering the threshold of liability
will reach more conduct.” Horwich, supra note 83, at 921.
86
August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,727.
87
Id. (emphasis added).
81
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C. Requirements for Trading Plans as an Affirmative Defense
Section (c) details three affirmative defenses to insider trading liability. The rule
provides that a trade is not “on the basis of” material nonpublic information if the
trade strictly complies88 with a binding contract,89 instruction,90 or Trading Plan91
that was entered into before “becoming aware” of the information. Since Trading
Plans are central to this Article, this summary will focus exclusively on them. A
Trading Plan must be written to qualify for the affirmative defense.92 It must specify
the amount, price, and date of the securities to be purchased or sold93 or include a
written “formula or algorithm, or computer program” that determines the same.94 In
addition, the Trading Plan must not permit any subsequent influence by the person
availing herself of the Plan “over how, when, or whether to effect [Plan] purchases
or sales . . . .”95 If the Plan grants discretion to another person to make trades under
it, that person must not be aware of material nonpublic information when doing so.96
Moreover, the affirmative defense is not available under a Plan if the person who
entered into the Plan subsequently altered or deviated from its terms.97 Nor is it
available if the person who entered into the Plan subsequently enters into or alters a
“corresponding or hedging transaction or position with respect to those securities.”98
A person is free to modify an existing Plan while unaware of material nonpublic
information, but this has the effect of terminating the existing Trading Plan and
entering into a new one.99 Finally, a Trading Plan only provides an affirmative
defense to insider trading liability when it was “entered into in good faith and not as
part of a plan or scheme to evade the prohibitions” of Rule 10b-5.100

88

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i) (2014).
Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(1).
90
Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(2).
91
Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(3).
92
Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A). Trading Plans differ from the other two Rule 10b5-1
affirmative defenses in this way. Neither the 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A)(1) contracts nor 10b51(c)(1)(i)(A)(2) instructions need be in writing to comply with the rule. See Exchange Act
Rules, Questions and Answers of General Applicability, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/exchangeactrules-interps.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/9URF-JBSK (last updated Feb. 13, 2012) [hereinafter SEC Interpretations]
(see Question 120.24 and accompanying text).
93
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(1).
94
Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(2).
95
Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(B)(3).
96
Id.
97
Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C); see also August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note
10, at 51,728.
98
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C); August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note
10, at 51,728.
99
August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,728 n.111.
100
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(ii).
89
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It is important to note that the SEC has made it clear that it does not regard the
act of terminating an existing Trading Plan while aware of material nonpublic
information as a violation of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.101 However, while one
may terminate an existing Plan without risk of insider trading liability for the
termination, the SEC has taken the position that such termination “could affect the
availability of the Rule 10b5-1(c) defense for prior plan transactions if it calls into
question whether the plan was ‘entered into in good faith and not as part of a plan or
scheme to evade’ the insider trading rules.”102 If a person were to cancel just one
trade under an existing Plan, this would constitute an alteration or deviation from
the Plan and would result in its termination.103 To qualify for the affirmative defense,
any subsequent transactions would have to be part of a new Plan.104 The affirmative
defense would apply to trades under the new Plan, but only so long as they satisfy
the requirements of the rule, including, of course, the requirement of good faith.105
If, after terminating an existing Plan, a person later created a new Trading Plan, then
“all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the period of time between
the cancellation of the old plan and the creation of the new plan” would be taken
into account in the determination as to whether the new Plan was established in good
faith.106 For instance, though former Qwest Communications CEO, Joseph Nacchio,
was charged for insider trading over a five-month period that spanned multiple
Trading Plans, he was only found criminally liable for trades that occurred after his
initial Plan was terminated.107 Thus, frequent Trading Plan modifications may
jeopardize availability of the affirmative defense.108
D. SEC’s Compromise, Scienter, and Lingering Questions
Although Rule 10b5-1’s definition of “on the basis of” as mere “awareness”
rejects the causal connection test endorsed in Adler,109 the availability of affirmative
defenses under the rule reflects a compromise. As noted above, while the Adler court
adopted the use test, it held that mere possession was enough to create a strong,
101

See SEC Interpretations, supra note 92 (explaining at Question 120.17 that Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 only apply to fraudulent conduct “in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security”).
102
Id. (see Question 120.18 and accompanying text).
103
Id. (see Question 120.19 and accompanying text).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
See United States v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140, 1147–48 (10th Cir. 2008), vacated in
part on other grounds en banc, 555 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009).
108
Peter J. Romero & Alan L. Dye, Insider Trading Under Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2,
in POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 893, 905–06 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study, July 18–20, 2002) (“It would be unwise . . . for a person to engage in frequent
modifications of trading plans.”).
109
See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 27, at 92–93 (stating that “Rule 10b5-1 formally
rejects the Adler position”).
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though rebuttable, presumption that the requisite causal connection was present.
Thus, when considering Rule 10b5-1’s awareness test alongside the availability of
its affirmative defenses, some commentators have suggested that the rule and Adler
are not so far apart, at least not in terms of practical consequence.110
Given the trend toward the use test in the federal courts, it is likely the SEC
chose to adopt this compromise rather than a strict knowing possession test to
improve the new rule’s chances of survival under judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless,
while Rule 10b5-1 reflects a compromise between the strict knowing possession test
originally advocated by the SEC and the use test in Adler, there remain clear
differences. Most importantly, while any evidence sufficient to undermine the causal
connection between the information and the trading may undermine presumption of
use under Adler, proof of awareness under 10b5-1 can only be defeated by the
strictly defined affirmative defenses detailed in 10b5-1(c). In other words, the
affirmative defenses identified by the rule are exclusive.111 The SEC rejected
comments suggesting that the 10b5-1 affirmative defenses should be understood as
part of a nonexclusive safe harbor.112 The SEC explained that “adding a catch-all
defense or redesignating the affirmative defenses as non-exclusive safe harbors
would effectively negate the clarity and certainty that the rule attempts to
provide.”113
Thus, an insider who trades while aware of material nonpublic information but
who presents incontrovertible evidence that that information was not a cause of the
trading will nevertheless be liable under the Rule 10b5-1 test for insider trading if
the proof does not fit squarely within the rule’s enumerated affirmative defenses.114
In other words, it appears the rule leaves the door open for one to be found liable for
insider trading without intent to deceive.115 Such a result seems to fly in the face of
the courts’ interpretation of Section 10(b) as requiring proof of scienter, and the SEC
cannot adopt rules that reach beyond the scope of their authorizing statutes.116

110

See, e.g., id. at 93 (“In practice, however, the difference between Adler and Rule
10b5n1 may prove insignificant.”); Stanley Veliotis, Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans and
Insiders’ Incentive to Misrepresent, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 313, 324 (2010) (“In a sense, Rule
10b5-1 is an attempt to address and codify aspects of . . . [Adler].”).
111
See August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,727.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Horwich, supra note 83, at 924, 948–49; cf. SEC Interpretations, supra note 92
(explaining under Question 120.08 a situation where a trader, without knowledge, would still
be liable even though default on a secured loan was the primary reason for the sale).
115
See Swanson, supra note 47, at 151–52.
116
See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44
(1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, . . . the agency[] must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 27, at 93 (“The
SEC cannot adopt rules that go beyond the scope of the statutes authorizing them.”); see also
Horwich, supra note 83, at 945–49 (discussing the power of the SEC, including an analysis
under Chevron).
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Though the SEC remains adamant that its adoption of 10b5-1 has done nothing
to diminish the element of scienter required for liability under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5,117 it is difficult to reconcile this position with the exclusive nature of the
available affirmative defenses.118 This has led a number of commentators to question
the SEC’s authority to adopt Rule 10b5-1.119 Ultimately, however, even if the SEC
did not exceed its authority when it decided the “use versus possession” question by
adopting 10b5-1, the resulting compromise walks a fine line that leaves little room
for the SEC to place further limitations on the affirmative defenses available under
the rule. Maintaining this delicate compromise will be crucial to any proposed
reforms to the rule.
III. INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF TRADING PLANS
Since the adoption of Rule 10b5-1 in 2000, the use of Trading Plans by corporate
insiders has become “ubiquitous”120 and accounts for billions of dollars of trading
each year.121 The pervasive use of Trading Plans should not be surprising. There are
a number of practical advantages to these Plans that make them attractive to insiders,
and most of them are innocent. But regulators, scholars, and market participants have
been aware of potential abuses of Rule 10b5-1 since it was first proposed. Indeed, a
former commissioner of the SEC, Joseph Grundfest, admitted that weaknesses
inherent to Trading Plans were “well known” by the commission and its staff at the
time Rule 10b5-1 was adopted.122 Many have complained that Trading Plans are full
of loopholes123 that offer a de facto “safe harbor” for “unethical behavior.”124

117
August 2000 Exchange Act Release, supra note 10, at 51,727 (“Scienter remains a
necessary element for liability under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5
thereunder, and Rule 10b5-1 does not change this.”).
118
See, e.g., Horwich, supra note 83, at 922 (noting that many commentators have
discredited the SEC’s claims); Swanson, supra note 47, at 196–99 (discussing the duplicitous
nature of Rule 10b5-1 and noting “the affirmative defenses themselves provide internal
inconsistencies”); Kevin E. Warner, Note, Rethinking Trades ‘On the Basis Of’ Inside
Information: Some Interpretations of SEC Rule 10b5-1, 83 B.U. L. REV. 281, 306 (2003)
(arguing that the SEC’s assurance “seems to conflict with an infallible legal logic”).
119
See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 27, at 93 (“The bulk of the evidence . . . raises
serious doubts as to the validity of Rule 10b5-1.”); Horwich, supra note 83, at 944.
120
Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6. The increase in Trading Plan
use has occurred among nonexecutive directors as well as among other corporate insiders.
See Pulliam & Barry, Directors Take Shelter in Trading Plans, supra note 6, at A1 (noting
that nonexecutive director use of Trading Plans has increased 55% since 2008, compared
with a 36% increase over the same period by all other corporate insiders).
121
See Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6.
122
Siconolfi & Eaglesham, supra note 6.
123
See, e.g., Veliotis, supra note 110, at 328–30; Cooke & Ng, supra note 6; Eaglesham
& Barry, supra note 6.
124
Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 6.
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The goal of this Part of the Article is to situate the current controversy over
Trading Plans by clarifying the stakes and stakeholders. This is done, first, by
identifying the benefits that the SEC intended Trading Plans would offer insiders
and the market in general. Second, the unintended abuses of Trading Plans are
considered. The different ways in which Trading Plans might be exploited to beat
the market are identified, and studies indicating that corporate insiders are in fact
using Trading Plans to beat the market are summarized. Finally, since Trading Plans
must be approved by firms, this Part concludes by exploring the extent to which
firms are aware of (and perhaps even complicit in) insiders’ use of Plan trading to
beat the market.
A. Intended Uses and Benefits of Trading Plans
Trading Plans allow insiders who are compensated in terms of stock and stock
options some flexibility to liquidate and diversify without risk of criminal liability.
In recent years equity compensation has become the predominate component of
corporate executive pay.125 Since such compensation would be significantly
diminished in value were significant restrictions placed on insiders’ ability to
trade,126 there should be little wonder that insiders are anxious to avail themselves
of these Plans and thereby increase their flexibility to sell the shares with which they
have been paid.127 And, of course, where the shares are more valuable to employees,
firms can achieve the same compensation while offering fewer of them; Trading
Plans, therefore, reduce costs to firms.128 The SEC expected and encouraged such
efficient use of Trading Plans.129
125
M. Todd Henderson, Insider Trading and CEO Pay, 64 VAND. L. REV. 505, 508
(2011) (Noting that between 1999 and 2008, “the average public company executive earned
more than half her total pay in the form of stock options or restricted stock”).
126
See id. at 509 (noting that if insiders are restricted in their ability to sell shares to
diversify their holdings, “this [restriction] will reduce the value of the shares granted”); see
also Muth, supra note 52, at 67 (“To enjoy the proceeds of selling stock issued as
compensation, the executive must be able to liquidate stock while in possession of inside
information.”).
127
See Sougata Mukherjee, The Dangerous Game Corporate Executives Are Playing,
TRIANGLE BIZBLOG (Dec. 11, 2012, 2:29 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/blog/
2012/12/the-dangerous-game-corporate.html?page=all, archived at http://perma.cc/8ZGHKNW.
128
See Henderson, supra note 125, at 509–10.
129
Linda Chatman Thomsen, then-director of the SEC Division of Enforcement,
explained that part of the point of Rule 10b5-1 was “to give executives opportunities to
diversify or become more liquid through the use of plans with prearranged trades without
facing the prospect of an insider trading investigation.” Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div.
of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Staff: Opening Remarks Before
the 15th Annual NASPP Conference (Oct. 10, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2007/spch101007lct.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/WQE6-J52G; see also
Henderson, supra note 125, at 516–17 (noting that 10b5-1 plans were “expected to increase
opportunities for optimization trading” and “increase the value of insiders’ shares”).

356

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

Moreover, Trading Plans offer some legal certainty for insiders and firms where
there was very little before. Prior to the adoption of 10b5-1, general counsel across
the country faced a predicament every time an officer or director requested to
purchase or sell company stock.130 As one commentator put it, under the old regime,
“the insider trading laws provided no means of assuring that a transaction in the
company’s securities by an insider would escape liability under these laws.”131
Under Rule 10b5-1, however, the law offers a sanctioned approach that can be
implemented by firms to moot the question of whether an insider had material
nonpublic information at the time the transaction takes place.132
Finally, Trading Plans allow firms to avoid much of the adverse perception
often associated with insider trades. Prior to Rule 10b5-1, there was always the
concern that the market would react to insider transactions as an indication of the
health of the company when, instead, the decision to trade was based on reasons
unique to the trader (such as portfolio diversification).133 By disclosing that insider
trading was pursuant to a Trading Plan (established without material nonpublic
information and well in advance of the actual trade), firms now have a means of
quelling adverse market reactions and suspicion of illegal trading.134 In addition,
Trading Plans allow insiders to spread their transactions out into smaller increments
over a long period of time. Such trades are less likely to attract unwarranted attention
by the market than would large, dramatic chunks during the narrow trading windows
following the firm’s quarterly filings (typically the only means of safely liquidating
shares prior to the advent of 10b5-1 Trading Plans).135
The practical advantages of Trading Plans listed above are all consistent with
the SEC’s stated rationale for Rule 10b5-1. But there are grounds for believing that
another reason, not endorsed by the SEC, offers the principal explanation of Trading
Plans’ popularity, namely that they provide a de facto safe harbor for insiders to beat
the market based on material nonpublic information.

130
See Donald H. Meiers, Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans: A Win-Win Situation,
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., May 1, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 12908239.
131
Id.
132
See id.; Henderson, supra note 125, at 514; Michael S. Melbinger, SEC Announces
Scrutiny of 10b5-1 Trading Plans, EXEC. COMP. BLOG (Oct. 11, 2007),
http://www.winston.com/en/executive-compensation-blog/sec-announces-scrutiny-of-10b5
-1-trading-plans.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3NGB-H7CD.
133
See, e.g., Romero & Dye, supra note 108, at 901 (“Open market sales by [insiders]
. . . often attract unwanted attention, due to the perception of many investors that such sales
may reflect a lack of confidence in the company.”).
134
Id. at 901–02; see also Meiers, supra note 130 (“A company’s implementation of an
insider trading policy . . . serves to demonstrate its good faith efforts to ensure that the
company and its insiders comply with the insider trading laws . . . .”).
135
See Romero & Dye, supra note 108, at 901–02.
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B. Unintended Uses of Trading Plans—Beating the Market
As one commentator noted, until 2005 “most accepted that 10b5-1 plans were
rarely abused and that scheduled trading was a good system to allow those with
inside information to trade in their companies’ stocks and diversify their personal
holdings.”136 In August 2005, however, Professor Alan Jagolinzer shared with the
Wall Street Journal the preliminary results of a study finding that insiders using
10b5-1 plans “earned returns on those trades that beat the market on average by 5.6%
percentage points over a six-month period.”137 According to Jagolinzer’s
subsequently published study, Trading Plan participants’ sales, which compose the
majority of Plan transactions, “tend to follow price increases and precede price
declines, generating statistically significant forward-looking abnormal returns.”138
The study also shows that Trading Plan “initiations are associated with subsequent
adverse news disclosure and that early [Trading Plan] termination is associated with
positive firm performance.”139 According to Jagolinzer, these results indicate that
some insiders are exploiting “unintended strategic loopholes” in Trading Plans to
trade strategically.140
Jagolinzer’s study caught the attention of the SEC. In March 2007, Linda
Chatman Thomsen, then Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, cited to the
Jagolinzer study, noting that data reflects that Trading Plans “are being abused in
various ways to facilitate trading based on inside information.”141 Thomsen then
warned, “[w]e’re looking at this—hard.”142 Despite this warning, the SEC failed to
take public action. The issue faded into the background after the market collapse of
2008, only to reemerge with a series of Wall Street Journal articles in 2012 and
2013. In November 2012, the Journal ran a front-page article143 sharing the results
of their own study, which found that among 20,237 executives who traded in their
own company’s shares within one week of their company’s making news, 1,418
recorded average gains of 10% (or avoided losses of 10% within one week of their
trades).144 Only half that number saw their stock move against them by that much.
The article suggests these abnormal returns can be attributed to the strategic use of
Trading Plans.145

136

Muth, supra note 52, at 81.
Cooke & Ng, supra note 6.
138
Jagolinzer, supra note 5, at 224.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 225.
141
Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks at the 2007 Corporate Counsel Institute (Mar. 8, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch030807lct2.htm#19, archived at
http://perma.cc/U6GS-XZR7.
142
Id.
143
Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck, supra note 6.
144
Id.
145
Id.
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C. The Firm’s Role
A recent study by Professor M. Todd Henderson suggests that, not only are
boards aware that company executives are availing themselves of Trading Plans to
profit from material nonpublic information, they “bargain” with executives over
such opportunities when setting executive pay.146 Henderson explains that different
firms treat insider trading differently. Some firms ban all insider trading, some
restrict it through blackout periods, and some grant insiders great flexibility to
trade.147 Henderson points to a prior study reflecting that “firms restricting insiders’
ability to trade pay about 13% more in total compensation than firms permitting
insiders to trade freely.”148 The implication is that some firms offer more liberal
insider trading policies as a form of “implicit compensation.”149 The value of this
compensation does not stem entirely from optimization trading (or diversification),
which was an intended benefit of Trading Plans.150 Henderson’s study shows that a
reduction in pay correlates to expected returns from informed trading as well: “For
insiders at firms where prior work shows informed trading is more likely and where,
in expectation, insiders are likely to earn abnormal returns from this trading, we see
statistically significant differences in pay compared with insiders at firms where
prior work shows informed trading is much less likely.”151 In short, “there is
evidence that firms and executives bargain about insider-trading profits, both from
optimization trades and informed trades, and that these profits are considered in
meeting an executive’s reservation wage.”152 Thus, Henderson concludes:
[T]he data suggest[s] that the board was relatively better informed about
the expected use of Rule 10b5-1 trading plans than the SEC, who wrote
the rule. If we take the SEC at its word that Rule 10b5-1 was intended to
encourage optimization trades but not informed trades, then the SEC made
146
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See Henderson, supra note 125, at 507 (describing the concept of “implicit
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Diversification is key to risk management in any investment portfolio. When firms
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Henderson, supra note 125, 509–22. Part of the rationale behind the adoption of 10b5-1(c)
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a mistake—the Rule encourages both types of trades. The evidence . . .
suggests that boards were aware of this potential in the Rule.153
If companies are complicit in their insiders’ use of material nonpublic
information to beat the market through the use of Trading Plans, as Henderson’s
study suggests they are, then what is to be done about it? What is the legal status of
such implicit compensation?
IV. DID 10B5-1 LEGALIZE NEW FORMS OF INSIDER TRADING?
In her 2007 speech referenced above, then Director of Enforcement Thomsen
stated, “if executives are in fact trading on inside information and using a [Trading
Plan] for cover, they should expect [10b5-1(c)] to provide no defense.”154 But as one
commentator noted, Thomsen “did not explain how such conduct violated the law
or under what circumstances an affirmative defense under Rule 10b5-1 would not
be available.”155
Just two weeks after the Wall Street Journal published the first article in its
series on Trading Plans in late 2012, the Manhattan U.S. Attorney’s office launched
a broad criminal investigation into whether these Plan trades violated securities
laws.156 But if, as some suggest, many insiders and firms are simply exploiting
“loopholes” in Trading Plan regulations, then there may be no grounds for
enforcement action. Instead, if action is to be taken, it must take the shape of legal
reform.
This Part addresses the legality of using Plans to trade strategically. While the
introduction of Trading Plans left much of the landscape of insider trading liability
unchanged, it (1) made some clearly illegal forms of insider trading more difficult
to detect and prosecute, and (2) it created new opportunities for insiders to profit
legally from material nonpublic information.
A. The Rule Does Not Affect the Status of Traditional Forms of Insider Trading,
but It Complicates Enforcement
As explained above, for a Trading Plan to qualify for the affirmative defense
the insider must not be aware of material nonpublic information at the time it is
adopted. Moreover, Rule 10b5-1 precludes any subsequent influence over the
content of a qualified Trading Plan once it is established. The rule, therefore, leaves
no room for traditional insider trading where the insider simply enters a buy or sell
order based on material nonpublic information. Nevertheless, there is much in the
rule that makes such traditional insider trading easier to engage in, and more difficult
to detect and prosecute.
153
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First, most companies impose blackout periods during which their employees
are not permitted to trade in firm shares.157 These blackout periods typically precede
important news release dates throughout the year (e.g., prior to quarterly and annual
reports).158 But because many companies permit employee trades through preexisting Trading Plans to occur during blackout periods,159 insiders in those
companies gain access to strategic trading opportunities that were not available prior
to the adoption of 10b5-1.160
Second, illegal insider trading under the guise of Trading Plans is made easier
by the fact that the rule places no limits on how soon the first trade may take place
after a Plan is established.161 For example, an insider could learn of material
nonpublic information, set up a Trading Plan, and begin trading under the Plan all
over the course of a few days.162 Such trading unquestionably violates the rule, but
the very fact that the company can respond to inquiries concerning the trade by
explaining they were part of a Trading Plan offers prima facie cover and may
forestall further investigation.163
Third, there is currently no requirement that firms disclose the establishment of
Trading Plans by their insiders, much less that they disclose the details of any such
plans.164 The lack of any disclosure requirement arguably makes illegal Plan trading
157

See WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC L. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 13:6.2, at 13113 (Practicing L. Inst., 2d. ed. 2006).
158
Id.
159
See Henderson, supra note 125, at 514.
160
See Jagolinzer, supra note 5, at 226.
161
See, e.g., Melbinger, supra note 20 (“Rule 10b5-1 does not impose any minimum
waiting period between the date that the insider adopts the plan and the date of the first
trade.”).
162
Indeed, Jon Hess, CEO of Hess Corporation, established a Trading Plan in February
2011 and began selling under the Plan on February 7, 2011. See Pulliam & Barry, Executives’
Good Luck, supra note 6; Pulliam & Barry, Investors Call for More Disclosure, supra note
6. Also, on March 9, 2006, Jeffrey Lorberbaum, the chairman and CEO of Mohawk
Industries Inc., established a Trading Plan. See Pulliam & Barry, Executives’ Good Luck,
supra note 6. He began selling shares under the Trading Plan just six days later on March
15. Id. Over the next two weeks, he sold over $10 million in shares. Id. On March 30, which
was the day after his last sale, the company announced lower than expected earnings and the
stock dropped 5.4%. Id.
163
See, e.g., In re Immucor Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:05-CV-2276-WSD, 2006 WL
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more profitable (because the market will not have an opportunity to adjust the stock
price in anticipation of the insider’s planned trading), and more difficult to detect.
Fourth, an insider may adopt multiple, inconsistent Trading Plans to create
subsequent opportunities for insider trading by Plan termination.165 For example,
three months prior to an earnings release, an insider might establish two Trading
Plans: one Plan orders the sale of 10,000 shares on the day before the release and
one orders the purchase of 10,000 shares on the day before the release. Then, two
days prior to the release, when the insider possesses material nonpublic information
about the substance of the release, she can terminate the buy order, or the sell order,
or both, depending on the nature of the news. Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(C)’s prohibition
against entering into or altering a “corresponding or hedging transaction or position”
would deprive the insider of the affirmative defense, and this conduct would
therefore be illegal under the rule.166 Nevertheless, again, the fact that Trading Plans
need not be disclosed could make it difficult for the SEC or shareholders to detect
the existence of the inconsistent Trading Plan.
Fifth, even where firms voluntarily disclose the establishment of Trading Plans,
the affirmative defense shifts the “awareness” test to the date the Plan was
established (rather than the execution date of Plan trades). This makes it more
difficult for the SEC and shareholders to link awareness of material nonpublic
information to the execution of a suspicious trade.167 Imagine an insider sells shares
under a Trading Plan (which was established two months prior) on the day before a
very disappointing earnings release. Under the rule, challenging the trade would
require proof of awareness two months ago, which would be much more difficult
than the relatively simple task of proving awareness of the substance of the earnings
release on the day before it occurred.168
Ultimately, however, while the adoption of Rule 10b5-1 may have created these
new opportunities for insiders to profit by trading on material nonpublic information
and avoid detection, the rule did not change the legal status of any of the conduct
outlined above—it was all illegal before the rule, and it all remains illegal under the
rule. Trading Plans did, however, alter the legal status of other forms of strategic
insider trading. This is the subject of the next section.
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B. Loopholes Created by Trading Plans
A legal “loophole” is a gap or ambiguity in a law that allows one to contravene
the spirit or intent of a law without violating its letter. In the context of insider trading
regulation, any opportunity for insiders to use material, nonpublic information to
maximize profits from the purchase or sale of their own company’s shares without
violating the law would constitute a loophole. It is important to distinguish a
loophole from a complication or challenge to efficient enforcement (the subject of
the last section). Insiders exploiting a true loophole are not subject to enforcement.
The only way to prevent the exploitation of a loophole is to close it with new law.
The introduction of Trading Plans introduced at least two loopholes in insider
trading regulation. First, they allow insiders to accelerate or delay the release of news
to maximize profits for prearranged Plan trades. Second, Trading Plans have created
an opportunity for insiders to enjoy risk-free options through the selective
termination of qualified Plans.
1. Altering Timing of Disclosure
With the adoption of Rule 10b5-1, insiders found that they were no longer
required to refrain from trading while in possession of material nonpublic
information, provided those trades were prearranged and comprised by a qualified
Plan. This created a new opportunity. Since insiders also control the timing of
disclosures, the rule freed them to time the release of subsequently obtained material
nonpublic information so as to maximize profits for their prearranged trades.169 A
number of commentators have identified strategic acceleration or delay of an
otherwise lawful release of information170 to benefit prearranged Plan transactions
as a “loophole” created with the adoption of Rule 10b5-1.171 Jagolinzer’s study
found on average Trading Plan initiation precedes adverse news that moves the stock
169

Id. at 226–27; see also Muth, supra note 52, at 70–71 (explaining that the plan’s
unusually short timeline allows executives to strategically execute a trade at a time when
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rule. See Form 8-K Disclosure, supra note 164, (noting current disclosure laws and proposing
a rule requiring more timely disclosure to better inform investor decisionmaking).
171
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-9.9% by 72.2 days.172 According to Jagolinzer, this indicates insiders are either
establishing plans while in possession of material nonpublic information or are
altering the timing of disclosures until after the trades have been planned.173
Since timing the release of material nonpublic information learned after the
Plan trades were set is not a subsequent modification to the Trading Plan, such
conduct does not violate Rule 10b5-1. As one commentator puts it, “[a]s long as an
insider in possession of any information is ‘toying with’ the timing of the release of
information and is not adjusting the timing of transactions under the plan, the insider
is not violating the rule.”174 Moreover, it does not appear that timing the release of
information to maximize profits for Plan trades is deceptive under Section 10(b) or
Rule 10b-5.175 After all, who is deceived by the timing of a truthful and otherwise
lawful disclosure? The point is made most saliently by considering the scenario in
which true, good news is released early to maximize profits under a Plan sale (or
bad news is accelerated to maximize a buy order). There is certainly no basis for the
claim that accelerated disclosure of truthful information is deceptive.176
Beyond timing the release of news to maximize Trading Plan profits, one
commentator has noted that insiders can also profit from timing the news itself.177
Insiders could, for example, push to accelerate or delay the signing of a firm contract
to benefit Plan trades.178 Since there is rarely a “correct” or clear maximally
beneficial date on which a contract should be signed, such influence on timing may
be quite harmless to the firm. If it were not harmless—if, say, the influence on timing
resulted in less beneficial contractual terms—then there would be a clear breach of
fiduciary duty. The point is that Rule 10b5-1 opens a new space within the law for
insiders to tinker with the timing of disclosures to benefit their trading.
2. Selective Termination of Plans
While Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit insiders from trading based on
material nonpublic information, they do not prohibit insiders from abstaining from
trading based on such information. Professor Henry Manne and others have
highlighted “insider abstention”179 as an example of inconsistency in insider trading
172
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law.180 As Manne put it, “[r]efraining from selling stock that would otherwise have
been sold has exactly the same economic effect on market price as a decision to buy
that same number of shares.”181 Manne goes on, the
upshot of all this is that people can make abnormal profits in the stock
market simply by knowing when not to buy and when not to sell. They
will not make as much perhaps as if they could trade on the information
more efficiently, but nonetheless they will still make supra-competitive
returns.182
Professor Jesse Fried has challenged the claim that insider abstention offers a
market advantage to insiders.183 According to Fried, so long as insiders remain
unable to actually trade while aware of material nonpublic information, “their ability
to abstain from trading on such information does not give them an advantage over
public shareholders.”184 The reason insiders who cannot trade while aware of
material nonpublic information do not gain an advantage over the market by insider
abstention is that any gains made by an insider who can abstain from a sale when
she learns of impending good news will be offset by the fact that she will be unable
to sell upon learning of impending bad news.185 In short, Fried explains, “the
insider’s ability to abstain on nonpublic information indicating that a planned trade
would be unfavorable merely compensates the insider for her inability to proceed
with a trade after learning nonpublic information indicating that the planned trade
would be favorable.”186 But Fried recognizes that the adoption of Rule 10b5-1, with
its affirmative defense for trades made pursuant to prearranged Plans, has upset this
equilibrium.187
The SEC has made clear the act of terminating an existing Trading Plan while
aware of material nonpublic information does not violate the law because it does not
involve the sale or purchase of a security.188 So, for example, if an insider’s Trading
Plan provides for the sale of 10,000 shares of her company’s stock on the day before
an earnings release, and she subsequently learns the company will beat analyst
expectations, she may terminate the Plan based on this information.189 Fried points
out that the ability to trade while aware of material nonpublic information under
information to abstain from trading and avoid violating Rule 10b-5).
180
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Rule 10b5-1, when combined with the ability to terminate a Trading Plan while
aware of material nonpublic information, introduces a previously nonexistent
opportunity for profit from insider abstention.190
A number of other commentators have identified the ability to selectively
terminate Trading Plans based on material nonpublic information as a loophole in
Rule 10b5-1.191 Insiders can enhance their strategic use of Trading Plan terminations
by basing Plan trades on nonpublic information that is not material at the time the
plan is established, but which may ripen into material information at the time the
trades are scheduled to take place.192 If the information does not pan out as expected,
the insider may just terminate the plan. In effect, the ability to terminate Trading
Plans based on material nonpublic information allows insiders to create a cost-free
option to buy or sell.193 Indeed, Jagolinzer’s study found that 46% of a random
sample of Trading Plan terminations of sell orders preceded positive news events for
the company, while only 11% of sell order terminations preceded negative news
events.194
Of course, the SEC has qualified its approval of strategic Trading Plan
terminations by warning that (1) early termination may deprive the insider of the
affirmative defense for prior transactions under the Plan,195 and (2) frequent early
terminations may raise concerns over whether the insider established any new
Trading Plans in good faith.196 These qualifications appear to significantly diminish
the impact of the selective termination loophole because they seem to preclude the
regular use of selective termination as an investment strategy. The insider may be
able to avoid liability for the strategic termination of a single Plan trade, but at the
price of potentially undermining the affirmative defense for any trades executed
under the terminated or subsequent Plans. There are, however, two points to be made
about this SEC guidance. First, it is phrased in vague terms that employ the
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noncommittal language, “could affect the availability”197 and “would be relevant to
a determination.”198 Second, the warnings were issued as Compliance and
Disclosure Interpretations, which merely reflect the “views of the staff” and are not
“rules, regulations, or statements of the Commission.”199 While it would certainly
be risky and unwise to ignore this guidance in practice, it is not binding on the courts
and it certainly warrants close scrutiny. The next two sections test the legitimacy of
this SEC guidance.
C. Does the Constraint of Good Faith Close the Loopholes?
Again, Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(ii) provides that the affirmative defense of a Trading
Plan is only available when the Plan was entered into “in good faith and not as part
of a plan or scheme to evade the prohibitions of this [rule].”200 Focusing first on
selective termination, how might the selective termination of a Plan trade put an
insider on the wrong side of this provision? As noted above, the SEC makes it clear
that the termination of a Plan based on material nonpublic information does not
violate the rule because it does not involve the purchase or sale of a security. But, as
noted above, the SEC also implies that such a termination may undermine the
affirmative defense for prior and subsequent Plan trades. The idea must be that
selective termination may be evidence that the insider understood at the time she
established the plan that she would terminate the Plan if she later acquired material
nonpublic information that a prearranged Plan trade would be disadvantageous.
Since such a “plan or scheme” would evade the general goal of Rule 10b-5 by
allowing insiders to systematically gain a market advantage through the use of
material nonpublic information, the Trading Plan would never have been qualified
and the affirmative defense would not therefore be available for any trades that
actually took place under the Plan. Similarly, if the creation of a new Plan after a
selective termination were part of the same “plan or scheme,” none of the trades
under that Plan would qualify for the affirmative defense either. Of course, even on
this account, the affirmative defense would still stand if the thought of terminating
based on material nonpublic information only occurred to the insider after the Plan
was established.
If this is indeed the qualification the SEC has in mind, how would it play out in
practice? Imagine the CEO of ABC, Inc. sets up a Trading Plan to sell off 100,000
shares of her ABC stock to diversify her portfolio. The Plan calls for the sale of
50,000 shares on the next two Fridays. When she sets up this Plan, the CEO has no
material nonpublic information, but she intends to cancel the Plan if she
subsequently learns ABC will release negative market-moving information prior to
197
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any of the scheduled trades. The Thursday before the first Plan trade is to be
executed, the CEO learns ABC will miss its previously published earnings guidance
by 10% and that this information will be released next Thursday during a regularly
scheduled earnings call. While aware of this information, the CEO allows the first
trade to go through, but then cancels the Plan to prevent the second trade from being
executed. The CEO’s share sale on the Friday before the announcement catches the
SEC’s attention and there is an inquiry. In her voluntary interview with the SEC, the
CEO candidly explains the trading strategy outlined above, including the fact that
she established the Plan with the intention to terminate it if she learned marketmoving bad news would be announced prior to a Plan trade. Should the CEO be
found liable for insider trading?
Based on the staff’s interpretations, it might be expected the SEC would find
the CEO entered into the Trading Plan in bad faith, as part of a “plan or scheme to
evade” the prohibitions of Rule 10b-5. Consequently, the CEO’s Plan would not
afford her an affirmative defense. Since the CEO was “aware” of material nonpublic
information at the time the first Plan trade was executed, and since no affirmative
defense is available, she would be liable for insider trading with respect to this sale
pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 under this interpretation of Rule 10b5-1.
But this logic is troubling. First, since the SEC admits the termination of an
order based on material nonpublic information is not a violation of Section 10(b) or
Rule 10b-5, how can one’s intent to selectively terminate a transaction at the time a
Trading Plan is established constitute a plan or scheme to evade Section 10(b) or
Rule 10b-5? Second, given the fact that it is perfectly legal to terminate a Plan based
on material nonpublic information, anyone setting up a plan would be irrational not
to expect to terminate the Plan if it turns out that subsequently revealed material
nonpublic information will make going through with the trades financially
disastrous. Third, note the odd result of depriving the CEO of the affirmative defense
post hoc. The CEO made the first Plan sale solely for the purpose of diversifying her
portfolio holdings. She did not use the material nonpublic information in her
possession to gain an unfair advantage over the counterparty to this trade.
Nevertheless, since she was “aware” of the material nonpublic information at the
time the trade took place, she would be liable pursuant to Rule 10b5-1 without any
evidence of scienter.
Of course the SEC’s objection to the practice of selective termination might be
more general. It might be that such a plan or scheme betrays bad faith in that it
violates the “spirit,” if not the letter of the law, and that this alone offers grounds for
depriving an insider of the affirmative defense under Rule 10b5-1(c). The SEC has
not issued any guidance or offered any interpretation of Rule 10b5-1 as it pertains
to accelerating or delaying the release of information to benefit Plan trades,201 but a
similar argument might be expected in that context. In short, the logic may be that
201
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insofar as both selective termination and timing the release of information offer
insiders opportunities to use Trading Plans to increase their trading profits from the
use of material nonpublic information, they violate the spirit of Section 10(b) and
therefore reflect bad faith.
If this is indeed the SEC’s position, it defines “good faith” based on the SEC’s
own expansive interpretations of the goals of Section 10(b). There is, however,
ample evidence of disagreement between the SEC and the federal courts over
precisely what the “spirit” of the prohibition of insider trading found in Section 10(b)
entails.
D. The “Spirit” Versus “Letter” of Insider Trading Law
The courts’ rejection of the SEC’s position in the “use versus possession” debate
in Adler and Smith offers just one example of many in which federal courts have
demonstrated a readiness to reign in the SEC’s aggressive interpretations of Section
10(b) in the context of insider trading. Most notably, the Supreme Court rejected the
SEC’s expansive interpretation of Section 10(b) as a mandate for parity of
information in the markets. In In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,202 the SEC maintained
that one of the “principal elements” on which Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 insider
trading liability rests is “the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of [material nonpublic information] knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing.”203 The SEC’s position that equal access to information
was a principal rationale behind insider trading liability was picked up by the federal
courts in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,204 and then persisted for the better part of
two decades before the Supreme Court explicitly rejected it in Chiarella v. United
States.205 In Chiarella, the Court held the SEC’s formulation of the broad parity of
information rule, “which departs radically from the established doctrine that duty
arises from a specific relationship between two parties, . . . should not be undertaken
absent some explicit evidence of congressional intent.”206 The Court then reaffirmed
its rejection of the SEC’s equal access rule three years later in Dirks v. SEC.207
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Chiarella and Dirks significantly diminished the SEC’s enforcement mandate.
Since those decisions, the SEC has had some success208 and some failure209 in its
attempts to regain the ground it lost. But regardless, it remains the case that the SEC
and the courts often find themselves at odds with respect to Section 10(b)’s mandate,
and therefore the scope of insider trading liability. Consequently, the SEC’s
understanding of “good faith” and conformity with the “spirit” of the law of insider
trading is often quite different from that of the courts. Given the SEC’s obvious
organizational incentives to continue to press for a broader mandate,210 this gap
between interpretations is likely to persist. Since it is by no means clear what is
entailed by the “spirit” of Section 10(b) and therefore Rule 10b-5, there are serious
moral and constitutional problems with turning to so vague a ground in defining the
scope of civil and criminal liability (and available defenses) under the “good faith”
provision of Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(ii).
One of the crucial moral presuppositions of Western liberal jurisprudence is the
principle of legality (sometimes expressed in the Latin phrase, Nullum crimen sine
lege).211 The principle requires that “there must be no crime or punishment except
in accordance with fixed, reasonably specific, and fairly ascertainable preestablished
law.”212 The principle gives expression to the basic moral intuition that individuals
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should have fair notice that criminal sanctions will be imposed for certain conduct
so they can plan their lives to avoid those sanctions.
This sound moral principle finds expression in the U.S. Constitution through
the prohibition of ex post facto laws213 and through the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. So, for example, a criminal statute that contains
terms that are too vague to identify with precision the conduct that is proscribed may
be struck down as violating due process of law.214 In Connally v. General
Construction Company,215 the Supreme Court held that a law is unconstitutionally
vague when a person of “common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning.”216
Some scholars complain that the criminal prohibition of insider trading suffers
from such vagueness.217 Indeed, Steven Cohen, founder of SAC Capital Advisors,
LP, and the subject of a recent high-profile insider trading investigation, raised the
issue in a recent deposition: “[i]t’s my belief that the rule [against insider trading] is
vague, and therefore, you can interpret the rule any way—you know, with—as a
lawyer, you can probably interpret it in lots of different ways.”218 Professor Homer
Kripke once noted that “fraud” in Rule 10b-5 has “come to mean anything that the
SEC dislikes because by picking cases in which it can dramatically describe the
facts, the SEC hopes that the facts will carry the law.”219 This raises another concern.
As Justice O’Connor explained in Kolender v. Lawson,220
the more important aspect of vagueness doctrine “is not actual notice, but
the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.”
Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal
statute may permit “a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.”221
The point here is not to make the strong claim that the current insider trading
enforcement regime should be struck down as unconstitutionally vague, but rather
to suggest that its lack of statutory definition raises this specter and, at a minimum,
213
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subjects it to moral scrutiny under the principle of legality. In light of this fact, the
SEC should be careful not to rely on creative interpretations of “good faith” (e.g.,
enlisting the “spirit” of a law that has yet to be defined by statute and which is
disputed by regulators and courts) to deprive insiders of the Trading Plan affirmative
defense when they have otherwise complied with the letter of the rule.
V. CANNOT SOLVE PROBLEM BY TWEAKING CURRENT RULE
To take stock, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-1 in part to resolve the “use versus
possession” debate and to bring clarity to the scope of insider trading liability. By
adopting the “awareness” test, the SEC preserved much of its preferred knowing
possession standard, but, in a nod to the decisions in Adler and Smith (and to the
Section 10(b) requirement of scienter), the affirmative defense for Trading Plans
was included in the rule as a compromise. In addition to the anticipated benefits, the
introduction of Trading Plans had some unintended consequences: (1) certain
aspects of Trading Plans allow the insider to more easily avoid detection and
enforcement of illegal insider trading, and (2) the Plans created loopholes that
arguably allow insiders to legally benefit from the use of material nonpublic
information. And studies have confirmed that insiders who use Trading Plans are
beating the market.
As the issue of Trading Plans continues to draw media attention, pressure
mounts for the SEC to take action. But what action should be taken? Two options
are before them. First, the SEC could attempt to address the issue through vigorous
enforcement. Second, the SEC could seek to amend the law by statute or rule change.
The recent announcements of investigations indicate the first option, enforcement,
will be part of the strategy. But while aggressive enforcement can elevate the risks
to would-be violators of the rules (perhaps compensating for the ways in which
Trading Plans have made violations more difficult to detect and enforce), it cannot
address the loopholes in the law. Moreover, the current state of uncertainty as to
what conduct actually constitutes a violation of insider trading law generates moral
and constitutional problems that would only be exasperated by aggressive
enforcement of purported Trading Plan abuse as a common law crime.
Consequently, it appears the second option, actual reform of the law of insider
trading through statute or rule change, is the most appropriate and most likely path
forward. Part VI outlines the reform advocated here. But before turning to this, it
will be useful to explain why some solutions that have already been floated by
scholars and market participants will not work.
A. Problems with Some Suggested “Tweaks” to Rule 10b5-1
The key to any successful reform of the existing 10b5-1 framework will be to
maintain the rule’s precarious compromise between the SEC’s preferred
“possession” test and the Section 10(b) requirement of scienter. The pressure for
change focuses on the affirmative defense for Trading Plans, but it is precisely the
availability of this defense that allowed the SEC to navigate the strait between the
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“possession” test and the “use” test adopted by the courts in Adler and Smith. In
short, any limitations imposed on the availability of the Trading Plan affirmative
defense must be careful not to undermine the already controversial claim by the SEC
that the rule respects the Section 10(b) element of scienter.
A number of changes to the affirmative defense for Trading Plans have been
suggested. These include requiring varying degrees of disclosure, limiting the ability
of Plan users to terminate their Plans, precluding Plan transactions during companyimposed blackout periods, prohibiting multiple or overlapping Plans, and imposing
a mandatory delay between establishment and trading under a Plan. Some of these
suggestions are more helpful than others, but none of them, individually or taken
together, will be sufficient to fully address the issue.
1. Requiring Disclosure
As noted above, there is currently no disclosure requirement for Trading Plans.
Some have suggested the SEC adopt a rule requiring that firms and insiders disclose
the establishment of Trading Plans, as well as any amendments, terminations, and
transactions under them.222 The SEC has indicated that while it is open to a new rule
requiring insiders to disclose Trading Plans ahead of trades,223 “there would need to
be careful consideration of the costs and benefits.”224 A rule requiring disclosure of
Trading Plans was proposed by the SEC in 2002 and was dropped.225 The 2002
proposal would have required companies to disclose the establishment of Trading
Plans by directors or executive officers on a Form 8-K. Although the proposed rule
would not have required disclosure of the specifics of the trades comprised by a
newly established Plan,226 more detailed information would have been required with
respect to Plan terminations or modifications.227 The stated rationale for the
proposed rule change was that “current reports disclosing that a director or executive
222

See, e.g., Letter from Jeff Mahoney to Mary Jo White, supra note 19; see also
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officer has entered into, modified or terminated a Rule 10b5-1 [Plan] . . . may
provide investors with more extensive disclosure of potentially useful information
as to management’s views of the performance and prospects of the company.”228 It
is unclear why the SEC dropped this proposal to require disclosure, but it raises a
number of concerns.
To begin, it is hard to reconcile the SEC’s stated rationale for the disclosure
requirement, offering “potentially useful information as to management’s views of
the performance and prospects of the company,”229 with the function of Trading
Plans as an affirmative defense. Trading Plans only offer an affirmative defense to
10b-5 liability because the rulemakers recognized insiders will sometimes want to
trade their company shares for reasons that have absolutely nothing to do with the
future “performance and prospects”230 of the company (e.g., diversification, or
paying a child’s college tuition). Moreover, an insider must be free of material
nonpublic information when establishing the Plan. Thus, as one commenter on the
rule put it, where the rule is being followed, “any subsequent transactions effected
pursuant to a 10b5-1 plan or arrangement does not reflect the officer or director’s
view at that time regarding the business or prospects of the company.”231 So for the
disclosure requirement to make sense (i.e., for it to ensure the disclosure of “useful
information” to investors), it must presume that insiders will violate the law on a
regular basis. Such a disclosure requirement reduces to incoherence.
Indeed, some have expressed the concern that required Trading Plan disclosure
would generate more confusion than clarity in the market.232 For example, disclosure
of a large Plan sale by the CEO of a company may create the impression among
investors that this reflects the CEO’s assessment of the future prospects of the
company. But, assuming the CEO is complying with the rule (and is not basing the
decision to sell on material nonpublic information), this impression would be false.
Nevertheless, the false impression could set off a selling spree that hurts other
investors as well as the CEO.233 Moreover, if the amount of stock to be bought or
sold under the Trading Plan is relatively small in comparison with the insider’s
overall holdings, disclosure “may give the transaction(s) more visibility than
warranted.”234 Finally, given that advance disclosure of a Trading Plan sale (or
purchase) could impact the price of the stock, investor expectations may be built
around the Plan. If no trades end up being executed under the Plan (either because
the undisclosed Plan transaction price is
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never hit, or because the Plan is modified or terminated before a transaction takes
place), then disappointed investors may cry foul.235
But the above problems with requiring disclosure of Trading Plans presume that
insiders are generally playing by the rules. There is little doubt that the current
pressure to require advance disclosure of Trading Plans stems from overwhelming
evidence of abuse and the thought that disclosure may have a mitigating effect.
There is, however, an irony in this justification for disclosure. A recent study
indicates that abnormal returns are significantly higher for transactions under
voluntarily disclosed Trading Plans (particularly those that provide specific Plan
details) than for those that are not disclosed.236 The explanation offered for this
phenomenon is that “disclosure provides value to a ‘hiding in plain sight’ strategy
because of its incremental legal protection,” given that courts are likely to credit
voluntary disclosure as evidence of legal compliance.237 Thus, it appears requiring
disclosure would only be effective in compelling disclosure from those firms whose
insiders are not abusing Trading plans.
2. Restricting Plan Termination
Many have suggested the best way to address the problem of selective Plan
termination as a means for insiders to beat the market is to impose restrictions on
Plan terminations. Professor Jesse Fried has suggested the rule be changed to require
that insiders wait until they are unaware of any material nonpublic information
before they are permitted to terminate their Plans.238 According to Fried, since most
plans involve selling small amounts of shares on a regular basis, “there should be
few liquidity or diversification costs to preventing insiders from canceling
prearranged trades when they have information indicating that the trades would be
unfavorable.”239 Others have suggested that the rule be revised to simply lock
insiders into Trading Plans for a fixed period (e.g., for six months or a year) before
they can terminate, or even for the entire duration of the Plan (similar to restrictions
on flexible health care spending accounts).240
235
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There would, of course, be costs associated with such restrictions on the power
to terminate. As explained above, any limitations placed on insiders’ use of their
company shares make them less valuable to the insider, and, consequently, more
shares must be offered by the firm to achieve the same compensation. The
restrictions would therefore come at a cost to the firm and its shareholders.
Moreover, some have suggested that selective termination provides additional
efficiency benefits by aligning the interests of management and shareholders
because “enabling managers to abstain from selling on good news allows them to
profit fully from the value that they create for shareholders.”241 Others have
suggested that allowing insiders to trade on material nonpublic information may help
prevent accounting fraud because it offers insiders a means of separating their
personal solvency from the company’s reported performance.242 This argument
would apply in the context of selective Plan terminations as well.
But economic considerations aside, the real problem with revising Rule 10b51 to restrict or preclude Plan terminations centers on the limits of the SEC’s
rulemaking authority. While the SEC has a history of expansive interpretations and
aggressive enforcement of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, since Chiarella, the courts
have been adamant that the SEC’s mandate is not so expansive as to outlaw all
profits from material nonpublic information—only those that involve some form of
fraudulent manipulation or deception in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security. And, as explained above, selective termination does not appear to involve
the purchase or sale of a security. One might respond, however, that the suggestion
is not to make selective termination an insider trading violation, but rather it is to
make refraining from termination (or refraining from termination based on material
nonpublic information—depending on which suggested revision to the rule is
followed) one more element that must be satisfied to avail oneself of the affirmative
defense for Trading Plans. There are a number of points to be made here.
First, recall that the Trading Plan affirmative defense was only included in Rule
10b5-1 to soften the harshness of its awareness test; without the affirmative defense,
the rule would have transformed insider trading into the practical equivalent of a
strict liability offense.243 Without the affirmative defense, any trade made by an
insider while merely aware of material nonpublic information would incur liability.
Assume Rule 10b5-1(c) is revised to deny the affirmative defense for Plan trades
when that Plan is terminated based on material nonpublic information. Now imagine
the CEO of XYZ Inc. sets up a Trading Plan (while unaware of material nonpublic
information) to liquidate some of her XYZ shares to pay for her daughter’s college
tuition. The Plan calls for the sale of 1,000 shares on the twenty-eighth of every
month for the next six months. A week after the Plan is established, she learns of
not be allowed to terminate the plan before six months or 12 months”).
241
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negative material nonpublic information about XYZ Inc. She allows the first three
trades under the Plan to be executed while she is aware of this information. She then
learns that XYZ will disclose this negative information the day prior to her fourth
scheduled trade under the Plan. She terminates the Plan on the basis of this material
nonpublic information (recall, the SEC admits such a termination is legal and
violates no laws). Under the proposed amendment to the rule, the result would be
liability for three instances of illegal insider trading. The fact that the Plan was set
up in good faith and without awareness of material nonpublic information would be
irrelevant to the CEO’s liability. Moreover, no proof that the first three transactions
took place solely to pay for her daughter’s college tuition would be available in her
defense because she was aware of material nonpublic information when they
occurred and the affirmative defense is unavailable. Such a result would be difficult
to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s recognition of the requirement of scienter for
violations of §10(b), and with the holdings in Adler and Smith.
Second, if the rule were revised to preclude the Trading Plan affirmative
defense where a Plan is terminated based on material nonpublic information, would
the Rule 10b5-1 “awareness” test also apply to this determination? If so, then assume
all the facts are the same as in the example above, but instead of terminating her Plan
to avoid selling after the release of bad news, the CEO terminated the Plan solely
because she just learned her daughter decided to ditch college and join the Air Force.
Here, under this proposed amendment, because the CEO happened to be aware of
material nonpublic information when she terminated the Plan (though she terminated
for other reasons), she would nevertheless be liable for three counts of insider
trading. Or imagine the result when an insider needs to, say, terminate a purchase
order under a Plan to insure that she has adequate funds to pay for her husband’s
emergency heart surgery. Is she to be liable for any prior Plan trades made while she
was aware of material nonpublic information? Again, such odd results cannot be
reconciled with the requirement of fraudulent deception or manipulation required
for Section 10(b) liability. But worse, there is absolutely nothing that is even
conceivably wrongful with the insider’s conduct in either of these two cases. Note
also that amending the rule to simply preclude Plan terminations altogether
(regardless of whether the insider is aware of material nonpublic information) would
render the same problematic result whenever insiders have legitimate personal
reasons for wishing to terminate a Plan. With any such restriction in place, insiders
would risk incurring criminal liability for conduct that is in no way wrongful.
Finally, one might argue that, even if an absolute restriction on Plan
terminations is not the answer, the rule should be modified to preclude companies
and insiders from making frequent modifications or terminations of Plans. But it is
hard to imagine how such a rule might look. The SEC’s current interpretation of the
rule that warns selective termination may call into question the good faith basis of
the Plan is clearly designed to limit frequent terminations. But, in addition to lacking
clarity, it has already been argued that this interpretation also leads to unacceptable
results.244
244
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3. Problems for Other Proposed Reforms
The following reforms to Rule 10b5-1 provide potential means to improving
enforcement and detection of violations under the current rule. First, firms and
insiders “should only be permitted . . . to buy or sell securities during companyadopted trading windows, which typically open after the announcement of the
financial results from a recently completed fiscal quarter and close prior to the close
of the next fiscal quarter.”245 Second, as noted above, there is currently no rule about
how long an insider must wait between establishing a Plan and trading under it.
Some have proposed a mandatory delay between Plan establishment and the first
trade under the Plan.246 Mandatory delays ranging from three247 to six248 months have
been suggested. The purpose of these two suggested rule changes would be to make
it difficult for insiders to disguise illegal trades based on material nonpublic
information behind Plan Trades.
One problem with these suggestions is that they will significantly decrease
insiders’ flexibility in using Trading Plans for legitimate purposes. As explained
above, any restriction on insiders’ ability to trade their shares will make the
company’s shares less valuable to insiders, which will in turn present a cost to firms.
Moreover, these suggestions will make it more difficult for insiders to avail
themselves of the Trading Plan affirmative defense to effect legitimate trades.
Imagine an insider has a stock option that will vest in one month and knows that she
will need to execute the option at that time to make a balloon payment on her house.
This insider is not aware of material nonpublic information at the time, but she
knows she may be aware of such information in one month. She would like to
establish a Trading Plan to execute the options when they vest in one month, but she
would be prevented from doing so if the rule were changed to, for instance, impose
a mandatory three- or six-month delay. With such restrictions on the use of Trading
Plans in place, the insider will have to wait the month. If she becomes aware of
material nonpublic information when her options vest, she will be forced to choose
between executing the options and incurring insider trading liability or foreclosure
on her home. Again, it is difficult to see how the requirement of scienter under
Section 10(b) could be reconciled with this harsh result. Thus, any benefits of these
suggested reforms in terms of deterring illegal insider trading must be balanced
against the risk that their potentially harsh application may not survive judicial
scrutiny.
Another suggested change has been to preclude multiple or overlapping
Trading Plans.249 This change would be directed at preventing the practice of
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hedging one Trading Plan with another.250 Since such hedging is already prohibited
by the rule, the change, like the last two, would amount to nothing more than an
attempt to make it more difficult to violate the law. And, also like the last two
proposed changes, any benefits in the form of enhanced detection and enforcement
of illegal conduct will have to be weighed against the decrease in flexibility to
insiders and firms in using Trading Plans for legitimate purposes. There are a
number of legitimate reasons for having multiple overlapping Plans. For example,
some have suggested that any Plan with a duration less than twelve months is
“aggressive.”251 Thus, if the typical Plan is one year or longer, it only stands to
reason that, as more near-term investment needs arise, an insider may wish to set up
a second consistent Plan to address those needs without having to terminate an
existing Plan, particularly if termination is likely to raise suspicion among
regulators. The limitation would become more suffocating still to insiders if it were
paired with restrictions on the termination of Plans. If an insider has no means of
terminating an existing Plan, and cannot establish an overlapping Plan, the insider
is out of luck in the event of a change in investment strategy, or worse, in a personal
or family emergency. Again, such restrictions may force the insider to trade outside
of a Plan, risking harsh results under the Rule 10b5-1 awareness test.
4. Need for Regime Change
Again, Rule 10b5-1 and its affirmative defense for Trading Plans reflects an
attempt by the SEC to resolve its differences with the federal courts in the “use
versus possession” debate. The rule was designed to give the SEC what it wanted
(an awareness test that would ease the burden of enforcement), while appeasing the
courts’ demand for scienter (with the affirmative defense). In addition, Trading
Plans would offer insiders more flexibility and certainty in legitimate trading. Since
its adoption, however, the rule has had unintended and unwanted consequences. A
number of reforms have been suggested by scholars and marketed participants, but
each of these reforms would likely upset this delicate compromise. This may explain
the SEC’s demonstrated hesitancy to embrace significant reform of Rule 10b5-1 to
date. Nevertheless, the media attention and consequent public pressure for Trading
Plan reform has virtually assured that some rule changes are on the horizon. As one
fund manager put it, “[I] would be shocked if the SEC” does not act.252 The takeaway
is that if there is to be enduring reform to the current Trading Plan regime, it cannot
be achieved by merely tweaking or supplementing the current language of Rule
10b5-1. An entirely new regime must be put in place.
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VI. FROM CRISIS TO RATIONAL REFORM
One’s choice of solutions to the Trading Plan problem will depend on where
one locates the crisis. Is the principal concern that Trading Plans have exposed a gap
in enforcement coverage resulting in some insiders being permitted to profit by
trading on their company’s material nonpublic information? Or is the controversy
over Trading Plans symptomatic of a broader and deeper concern: that the current
enforcement coverage is unprincipled, undefined, and therefore irrational and
inefficient. Though the media and SEC focus has been on the ability of insiders to
exploit Trading Plans to beat the market, no one has stopped to ask why—at least in
the context of Trading Plan transactions authorized by the insider’s firm—this is a
problem. It is only a problem if such trading is harmful or unfair. So far it has simply
been assumed that such Plan trading is harmful and unfair. But an irony in the SEC’s
introduction of Trading Plans has been that their efficient use by insiders and firms
as a means of compensation has exposed a discrete sphere of insider trading that is
economically harmless and morally unproblematic. Thus, rather than serve to
increase the enforcement power of the SEC, the introduction of Trading Plans may
have cleared the path to rational reform in insider trading law through liberalization
and decriminalization. Such a proposed reform is motivated and outlined in what
follows.
As noted above, Section 10(b) insider trading liability typically falls under one
of two theories: the classical theory and the misappropriation theory. This Author
has argued elsewhere253 that, at least for purposes of moral and economic evaluation,
it makes sense to refine the distinction still further by dividing the classical theory
into two more categories based on whether the insider has undertaken some express
or tacit commitment not to trade on her company’s material nonpublic information:
Issuer-Proscribed Insider Trading: Insider trades on material nonpublic
information where the insider has promised—or otherwise undertaken
pursuant to company policy [express or implied]—not to trade on such
information.254
Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading: Insider trades on material nonpublic
information [with the firm’s approval] . . . (It is presumed that the issuer’s
policy allowing insider trading is disclosed to the investing public.)255
Assuming an imaginary legal regime that does not already prohibit insider
trading,256 this Author has argued a rigorous moral and economic analysis reflects
that, while both trading under the misappropriation theory and issuer-proscribed
253
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insider trading are immoral and economically inefficient, issuer-licensed insider
trading is morally permissible and harmless from the standpoint of economic
efficiency.257 If this conclusion is correct, then not only is liability for issuer-licensed
insider trading unnecessary, it is unfair and unjust. Nevertheless, there remains the
difficulty of tailoring an enforcement regime that can efficiently distinguish between
these permissible and impermissible forms of insider trading. A modified form of
the 10b5-1 Trading Plan might serve this purpose.
Recall that firms typically anticipate and negotiate the ability of employees to
use Trading Plans to profit from the use of material nonpublic information. As noted
in Part V.A.1, firms relying on market-beating Plan trading as part of their
compensation packages typically disclose the establishment of Trading Plans in their
regulatory filings.258 Such permission and disclosure begins to resemble the use of
Trading Plans as a limited form of issuer-licensed insider trading. This Article
argues, such use of Trading Plans should not be regarded as a source of concern, but
rather openly embraced and expanded by the law. The liberalizing move of openly
permitting issuer-licensed insider trading as regulated through a modified Trading
Plan model would result in a more rational, efficient, and just insider trading
enforcement regime. The proposed reform is outlined first, and then it is defended.
A. Proposed Regime Change
The reform proposed here would modify Trading Plans (henceforth “Modified
Trading Plans” or “Modified Plans”) to permit insiders complete freedom to actively
trade (or abstain from trading) based on their firm’s material nonpublic information,
so long as (1) the insider’s Modified Plan is approved by the firm and (2) the
authorizing firm has disclosed to the investing public that it allows its insiders to
trade based on the firm’s material nonpublic information through Modified Plans.
By requiring the firm to authorize each Modified Plan, the new rule would
ensure only issuer-licensed insider trading would be granted safe harbor. Issuerproscribed and misappropriation trading would remain subject to Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 liability. Authorization of these Modified Plans could be handled directly
by the firm’s general counsel or through its compliance department. Most firms
already have some form of procedure in place for authorizing Trading Plans under
the current regime, and this new rule would not require any significant change in
their practices.
Firms allowing insiders to trade pursuant to Modified Trading Plans under the
liberal regime proposed here must disclose this practice. But the firm’s Modified
257
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Trading Plan disclosure requirement will end there. Firms will neither be required
to disclose ex ante the contents of its insiders Modified Plans, nor when they are
established, altered, or terminated. Nevertheless, this minimal disclosure
requirement will be sufficient to place the investing public on notice that the firm
allows its employees to trade based on the firm’s material nonpublic information.259
It will, therefore, allow investors to make an informed decision about whether to
trade in the firm’s shares.260 At the same time, this minimal disclosure requirement
will avoid the problems of front-running and of potentially misleading the public
that would likely arise if more detailed disclosure were required.261
Though firms should not be required to disclose individual Modified Trading
Plans or their contents ex ante, insofar as the ability to use these Modified Plans will
be bargained for by firms as part of their compensation for employees, firms should
disclose this compensation ex post. Firms should therefore disclose their insiders’
Modified Trading Plan profits in some summary form.262
Finally, the Adler use test (supplemented by the strong presumption of use
where there is knowing possession of material nonpublic information263) should
replace the current Rule 10b5-1 awareness test in determining insider trading
liability for all trades that occur outside Modified Trading Plans. This will have the
effect of making Modified Trading Plans a nonexclusive safe harbor from Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 insider trading liability. As explained above, despite the SEC’s
stated aspiration of improving “clarity and certainty” in insider trading law with the
introduction of its awareness standard,264 it has added to the confusion. At least in
the context of insider trading, the SEC simply invented the term “awareness.” This
has left many confused as to whether “awareness” differs from “knowing
possession,” and if so, how.265 Moreover, the “awareness” test must be applied in
259
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tandem with the Rule 10b5-1 affirmative defenses, which are designed to prevent
any “overbroad” applications.266 But, as noted above, SEC interpretations of the
“good-faith” restriction on the availability of the affirmative defenses under the Rule
leave insiders guessing as to whether their compliance with the letter of the law will
not still leave them exposed to civil and criminal liability. Where the “awareness”
test leaves room for civil or criminal liability without scienter, the requirement of
deliberate use would protect insiders from being found criminally liable for morally
innocent conduct. Thus, adopting the Adler use test appears to be the best way to
bring coherence to the existing enforcement regime by respecting the Section 10(b)
requirement of scienter without undermining enforcement.
Having laid out the basic outline for the proposed reform, the next sections
evaluate the comparative advantages of the proposed reform.
B. No Economic Harm and Clear Economic Benefits
The scholarly debate concerning the overall economic impact of insider trading
on individual traders and the market is vigorous and ongoing.267 The point that needs
to be emphasized here, however, is that the best arguments for economic harms and
inefficiencies resulting from insider trading would not apply to the issuer-licensed
insider trading permitted through the proposed Modified Trading Plans. Instead,
there would be a number of obvious economic advantages that could be gained by
legalizing issuer-licensed insider trading through Modified Trading Plans.
The impact of insider trading on the counterparties to insider transactions is
disputed.268 The argument that the counterparty is harmed by insider trading
typically turns on the seemingly straightforward claim that, if the counterparty knew
what the insider knows, then she would not have sold at the price she did.269 The
counterparty, therefore, loses the difference between the transaction price and the
price the stock would trade at with the release of the insider’s material nonpublic
information. But, as many commentators have recognized (most notably Professor
Henry Manne), the relevant issue is not what the counterparty would have done if
she had the same information as the insider, but whether the counterparty would
have behaved any differently had the insider never traded at all.270 In short, an
10b5-1’s awareness standard matches the SEC’s knowing possession position, the two
doctrines certainly could be the same.”).
266
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insider’s trading only inflicts an economic harm on the counterparty if, but for the
insider’s trading, the counterparty would not have traded.271 This is almost never the
case where trades are made on the open market. Of course, sufficient insider entry
into the market for a stock may move its price. Such price movement may, in turn,
lead speculators (who typically trade based on price) to trade in the relevant stock.272
But this does not result in an obvious net economic harm to those who trade in the
stock while insiders affect its price. This is because it is likely there will be an equal
number of short-swing investors trading on the same side as the insiders as there will
be trading against them.273
But even if one rejects this logic and remains convinced that someone must be
paying for the insider’s risk-free profits—it must be the firm’s shareholders (both
present and future)—this is not a problem for issuer-licensed insider trading. As
noted in Part III.C, where firms expressly or tacitly approve of their insiders’ trading
on material nonpublic information, they offset the insiders’ gains with a reduction
in other forms of compensation. Consequently, as Professor Henderson explains,
there is no economic harm: “Current shareholders should be happy with a deal that
pays managers in part out of the hide of future shareholders,” and ultimately the firm
will “internalize any costs arising from this payment scheme, since future
shareholders should take this into account when deciding whether and at what price
to buy shares.”274 Moreover, since most shareholders are diversified, those “who
have to pay less for executive talent in one firm have to pay more in another firm,
simply by virtue of when they enter the shareholder pool.”275 Thus, “[o]n average,
shareholders should be indifferent.”276
Another economic harm commonly attributed to insider trading is that it forces
market makers to increase the spread between their bid and ask prices to protect
against adverse selection by insider trading.277 This increase in the bid-ask spread
can inflict an economic harm on firms by raising their cost of capital. But where
such insider trading is issuer-licensed, the firms willingly internalize this cost, again,
presumably because this cost is outweighed by corresponding benefits to the firm.278
It is important to emphasize, however, that the result is not economically harmless
when firm members engage in issuer-proscribed insider trading (i.e., in breach of an
express or implied commitment to the firm not to trade). This is because firms may
not recover the costs of issuer-proscribed insider trading through reduced direct
compensation. Consequently, such trading may hurt both current and future
shareholders of the firm.
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Insider trading incentivizes entrepreneurialism by allowing insiders to profit
from the good news they generate for the firm, which is often regarded as a virtue.279
But the countervailing concern is that the ability to trade on material nonpublic
information can just as easily create perverse incentives for firm employees to create
bad news.280 Insider traders profit from volatility of any kind—good or bad. But
there are a number of considerations that would weaken any incentive for insiders
to try to create bad news. For example, such conduct would likely affect their
compensation and put their jobs in jeopardy.281 But, in any event, under the reform
proposed here, only trading pursuant to a Modified Trading Plan that is preapproved
by the firm would be permitted. All other forms of insider trading currently
proscribed by law would remain illegal. Consequently, firms would be free to reject
any proposed short selling by employees. Indeed the firm will be free to tailor its
employee insider trading practices however it chooses. They would be free to reject
any trading suspected as harmful to the firm. For example, a firm that otherwise
allows Modified Trading Plan transactions could impose a blackout during a
takeover negotiation.
One of the more significant costs to firms from insider trading is that of
compliance and litigation. But it should be easy to see how permitting issuerlicensed trading through Modified Trading Plans should significantly reduce such
costs. It was noted above that 10b5-1 Trading Plans have already significantly
reduced compliance costs by offering firms an express rule-based procedure
(however flawed) for allowing insiders to trade while minimizing risk of liability. In
addition, the availability of the affirmative defense for Trading Plans helps firms
discourage civil and criminal insider-trading-related actions against the firm and its
insiders. Liberalizing the rule and expanding the safe harbor for insiders to trade
would only amplify these advantages to firms.
C. Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading Is Morally Permissible
But economic considerations aside, one might still object that all insider trading
based on material nonpublic information should continue to be proscribed because
it is inherently dishonest, deceptive, and unfair. While there is truth to this claim
when directed to issuer-proscribed insider trading and trading under the
misappropriation theory,282 there is no moral basis for proscribing the issuer-licensed
insider trading that would be permitted under this proposal. Both issuer-proscribed
insider trading and trading under the misappropriation theory involve dishonesty and
deception, the former by breaching a commitment to the firm283 and the latter by
279
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breaching a commitment to the source of the information.284 Aside from whatever
inherent wrong there may be in breaking promises generally, the issue-proscribed
trader and the misappropriator impose an identifiable harm on the firm and the
source respectively by undermining the value of the commitment that was sought.285
In addition, one could argue the issuer-proscribed insider trader enjoys an unfair
advantage over other market participants. This is because the other market
participants reasonably operate under the presumption that no insider trading based
on material nonpublic information occurs by insiders of firms that do not permit
such trading. Market participants may price and trade in that company’s shares with
this presumption in mind. When the issuer-proscribed insider trades on material
nonpublic information, she takes unfair advantage of market expectations built
around this understanding.286
But notice, the issuer-licensed insider who trades pursuant to the Modified
Trading Plans proposed here is neither dishonest nor unfair. There is no dishonesty
or deception vis-à-vis the firm because the insider has candidly negotiated her ability
to trade on material nonpublic information as part of her compensation, and the firm
must approve each Modified Plan trade before it is made.287 And there is no
deception or unfairness vis-à-vis other market participants because the Modified
Trading Plan disclosure requirement gives the market notice that insiders may trade
based on the firm’s material nonpublic information.288 Market participants may,
therefore, demand a correspondingly lower price for the stock or refuse to trade in
the firm’s shares altogether—the choice is theirs.289 By respecting other market
participants with this disclosure, the issuer-licensed insider trader who trades
pursuant to a Modified Plan does not take advantage. In the words of philosopher
Immanuel Kant, market participants are thereby respected as “ends in themselves”
and not as mere means to the trader’s ends.290
D. The Proposed Reform Is Consistent with Existing Statutory Authority
The SEC’s rulemaking authority can effect entirely the reforms proposed here
because they are consistent with statutory authority and current Supreme Court
precedent.291 Recall that Section 10(b) insider trading liability must capture some
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fraudulent deception on the part of the trader.292 Under the misappropriation theory
as articulated in O’Hagan, the fraud is on the source of the information.293 Under the
classical theory as articulated in Chiarella, the fraud is on the shareholder (or future
shareholder).294 In the case of misappropriation, the deception lies in the failure to
disclose the intention to trade to the source of the information. The deception being
that, without such disclosure, the information is obtained under false pretenses.295 In
the case of the classical insider, the deception also lies in the failure to disclose, but
it is typically thought the required disclosure pertains to the underlying information,
not the intent to trade. There is, however, no obvious reason for this asymmetry,
particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s claim in O’Hagan that the two theories
are intended to complement one another in capturing the entire universe of the same
deceptive conduct (the one when it is perpetrated by insiders and the other when it
is perpetrated by outsiders).296 If the misappropriation model is followed, disclosure
to the investing public that a firm will allow its insiders to trade based on material
nonpublic information through Modified Trading Plans when it is in the interest of
the firm should be adequate to put current and future shareholders on notice and
allow the firm to avoid Section 10(b) deception under O’Hagan. Market participants
can then choose to buy, hold, or sell shares in the firm informed by this information.
And, no doubt, the firm’s decision whether to continue to offer compensation
through Modified Trading Plans will in turn be informed by the marketplace’s
reaction to its policy.297
The claim that firms’ advance disclosure of intent to allow insiders to trade on
their material nonpublic information should be sufficient disclosure to avoid Section
10(b) deception is not so outrageous as to have never been advanced before. For
example, Professor Henderson argues there is “arguably no deception [under
O’Hagan] in a case in which the firm discloses that insiders are likely to be trading
based on informational advantages.”298 Henderson adds the disclose or abstain
requirement may be satisfied by the “generic disclosure about insider propensity to
trade on inside information,” which is likely to “achieve the same kind of price
adjustment and cost internalization” as full disclosure of the actual facts “on
average.”299
Moreover, the sufficiency of notice of intent to trade on material nonpublic
information is reinforced by the Supreme Court’s emphasis in Chiarella that Section
10(b) does not ensure parity of information; it only protects against information
advantages acquired by deception.300 Accordingly, allowing insiders to trade based
on material nonpublic information according to Modified Trading Plans, as
292
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proposed here, would simply add one more category of such trading to those already
permitted, such as those who trade based on information acquired by accident or
eavesdropping,301 those who trade where the tipper does not benefit,302 those who
trade where intent to trade is announced to the source under the misappropriation
theory,303 and those who engage in insider abstinence (as discussed in detail above).
Finally, some have argued the real rationale behind the prohibition of insider
trading is less about fraud than it is about property rights to information304 or simply
wrongful conduct.305 If this is true, the nonexclusive safe harbor for insider trading
pursuant to Modified Trading Plans proposed here would be perfectly consistent.
After all, such trading would not be permitted unless first approved by the
proprietors of the information (the firm) and such issuer-licensed trading would not
be wrongful.
E. Existing Enforcement Regime Sufficient to Address Timing of Disclosure
The reform proposed here does nothing to specifically address the issue of
timing disclosures around Plan trades.306 The availability of firm-sanctioned
Modified Trading Plans would, however, significantly reduce incentives for insiders
to time disclosures (or to accelerate or delay the making of news) to advantage
trades. After all, Modified Trading Plans could be established at any time to take
advantage of news in its natural course. And, in any event, as indicated above, the
existing regime seems adequate to address any harm to the firm or investors from
improper timing of disclosures. For example, the existing regime already has the
ability to find liability for false disclosures, or disclosures that were improperly
omitted from required filings.307 This leaves only harmless acceleration or delay of
disclosure that is otherwise permitted by disclosure rules. The apparent lack of harm
and extreme difficulty of proof relating to such tinkering with the timing of
disclosure or news to benefit Plan trades (along with the reduced incentive for such
timing decisions under a Modified Trading Plan regime) suggest that direct
regulation would do more harm than good by placing otherwise innocent timing
decisions under regulatory scrutiny.
In sum, consider some obvious advantages of adopting the reforms outlined
above over preserving the existing regime. The proposed reforms offer a coherent
approach to insider trading enforcement—whether it is justified in terms of fraud,
301
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wrongful conduct, or property rights. Permissible and impermissible insider trading
can now be more clearly delineated. The conduct that is proscribed can actually be
enforced with justifiable vigor because it only captures conduct that is in fact
deceitful, unfair, and harmful. By contrast, in addition to allowing for the
prosecution of insider trading absent a showing of scienter, the existing regime
punishes issuer-licensed insider trading (which is not deceitful, unfair, or harmful)
with massive fines and stiff prison sentences. Litigation costs to firms defending
against insider trading claims will be reduced under the proposed reform. Arguably
no statutory revisions would be necessary for its implementation; the change could
be effected entirely through rulemaking. It is true the SEC would have to eat some
humble pie in admitting, as it turns out, not all insider trading based on material
nonpublic information is wrong and harmful (something they have been unwilling
to admit so far), but the benefit of a more rational and just enforcement regime
should be worth it.
VII. CONCLUSION
The SEC is poised to take action in the face of compelling evidence that
corporate insiders are availing themselves of rule-sanctioned Trading Plans to beat
the market. Since the market advantage insiders have enjoyed from Plan trading can
be traced to loopholes in the current regulatory scheme, increased enforcement of
the existing rules cannot solve the problem. But simply tweaking the existing rule
structure to close these loopholes would not work either. This is because the SEC
adopted the current rule as a part of a delicate compromise with the courts in the
“use versus possession” debate over the appropriate test of scienter for insider
trading liability. The current rule reflects the SEC’s preferred test (mere
“awareness”), but it provides for Trading Plans as an affirmative defense in order to
pass judicial scrutiny. Any attempt to simply close the loopholes in Trading Plans
while maintaining the awareness test would upset this delicate compromise. Thus,
only a comprehensive change to the current insider trading enforcement regime can
address the issue. The SEC should confront this crisis by adopting much-needed
reform.
The reform proposed here begins with the recognition that Plan trading is
generally done with the firm’s awareness and consent. Such trading is, therefore, a
form of issuer-licensed insider trading. Since there are strong arguments that there
is no moral wrong or economic harm done by issuer-licensed insider trading, the
regulatory regime should openly embrace it as a permissible form of compensation
through firm-sanctioned Modified Trading Plans, so long as there is adequate
disclosure. Though such liberalization would represent a radical departure from the
current enforcement regime, it would be within the SEC’s rulemaking authority and
would be consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Most importantly, it would
dramatically improve the current enforcement regime in terms of justice, clarity,
efficiency, and coherence.
The proposed liberalization of insider trading law would be limited strictly to
issuer-licensed insider trading through Modified Trading Plans; it would not protect
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insiders who trade by deception. Moreover, insider profits from Modified Trading
Plan transactions should be disclosed to the investing public.
It is sometimes said there is nothing like a good crisis for effecting much needed
change. The current media attention and public scrutiny over corporate insiders’
exploitation of rule-sanction Trading Plans may be just the crisis to spur the SEC to
adopt a more rational and just approach to insider trading enforcement. The outline
for such reform has been proposed herein.

